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Convicting the Innocent in Transnational 
Criminal Cases : A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis Approach to the problem* 
BY 
L. Song ~ichardson? 
The adjudication of transnational criminal cases is burdened by a very 
narrow compulsory process mechanism known as Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties. These treaties regularize foreign evidence gathering for prosecutors 
and explicitly prevent their use by criminal defendants. The danger of inaccurate 
verdicts and wrongful convictions that may result from unequal access to 
evidence highlights the need to resolve this flawed transnational adjudication 
process, and specifically, its evidentiary method. Building on the works of Neil 
Komesar, Ronald Coase, and Mancur Nelson, the author utilizes a comparative 
institutional analysis approach to consider the question of how to obtain parity 
between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to compel foreign 
evidence in transnational criminal cases. The issue is of great importance in a 
post-911 1 world, where the fairness and accuracy norms that underpin criminal 
prosecutions are increasingly ephemeral and illusory. The comparative 
framework illumes the important considerations for identifying the institution 
best suited to achieve the norm of parity. No criminal process scholar explicitly 
utilizes the comparative institutional analysis framework. This oversight is a 
mistake. The comparative framework provides an ideal theory to dissect 
criminal process questions. Explicit institutional comparison, rather than 
simplistic single institutional considerations, should underlie all criminal process 
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My question is: Why should American citizens accused of a crime. . .be stuck 
with a process that the Justice Department itself has called "cumbersome and 
ineffective?"' 
At the core of the legal objections is the belief that it is improper in our 
adversarial system of justice to deny defendants compulsory process and other 
effective procedures from[sic] compelling evidence abroad if those procedures 
are available to the prosecution. . .. 
Senator Jesse ~ e l r n s ~  
This Article begins with two scenarios drawn from actual cases. They help 
describe and contextualize the disparity in the ability to compel foreign evidence 
that exists in the adjudication of transnational criminal cases as a result of the 
powerful Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (hereinafter MLATs). MLATs 
regularize foreign evidence gathering for prosecutors and explicitly prevent their 
use by criminal defendants. The facts highlight how the treaties create a 
compulsion disparity between the government and defendants in their ability to 
gather foreign evidence. Underlying these facts is the dark premise that the 
transnational criminal adjudication process in the United States, particularly its 
evidentiary method, is deeply flawed. 
A. Scenario One: The ~n lucky  ~ r i v e g  
Mr. Atkins is long haul truck driver who lives in Canada. He makes his 
living delivering items to or picking up items from the United States. He is 
barely able to make ends meet. He uses all the money he makes to care for his 
wife and two children. Because of his limited resources, he does not possess his 
own truck. Instead, he works for a number of trucking companies that allow him 
to use their trucks when they hire him. 
One evening, Mr. Atkins received a telephone call from Gary, the 
dispatcher for one of the trucking companies. Gary and Mr. Atkins were well 
acquainted since Mr. Atkins had worked for that trucking company many times 
in the past. Gary asked if he was available to pick up a load of steel pipes from 
the United States early the next morning. Mr. Atkins was happy to agree. There 
1. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands, Report of the Committee 
tm Foreign Relations, U.S.-Cayman Is., at 175, Mar. 19, 1990, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 101-8, (1989) 
[hereinafter Cayman Islands] (quoting Senator Jesse Helms). 
2. Quoted in Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 93,101 (1997). 
3. This scenario is loosely based on the facts of a criminal case in which the author was 
involved. The names and facts have been slightly altered to protect the privacy of the parties 
involved and to better illustrate the dangers of the lack of compulsion parity in transnational criminal 
cases. 
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was nothing unusual about the conversation. He would be paid his normal fee 
and, as usual, the truck would be waiting for him in the company's locked and 
secure yard. The keys would be in the ignition and everything he needed to pick 
up the load would be on the truck, including tarps. 
At 4 a.m. the next morning, Mr. Atkins arrived at the trucking company. He 
met John, an employee who guarded the yard, at the locked gate. He knew John 
from his prior work for the company. The two chatted for a few minutes and 
then John unlocked the gate and led Mr. Atkins to the flatbed truck he would be 
driving. Mr. Atkins inspected the truck to make sure that everything he needed 
was there. He noticed that there were tarps rolled up and secured to the back of 
the trailer. Everything appeared to be in order so Mr. Atkins drove to the border. 
When Mr. Atkins arrived at the border, he was sent by a border patrol agent 
to secondary inspection. He was told that it was just a routine inspection. Mr. 
Atkins was not surprised. Since September 1 I&, he had been sent to secondary 
inspection before. He went to the waiting room, drank some coffee and read the 
paper while waiting for agents to complete the inspection. Meanwhile, border 
patrol agents conducted a thorough search of the truck. They unrolled the tarps 
that were secured on the back of the trailer. They found 100 kilograms of 
marijuana carefully hidden inside. 
Mr. Atkins was arrested on the spot and taken into federal custody. He was 
subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance in federal district court. His defense was that he did not know the 
marijuana was in the tarps. Pretrial, Mr. Atkins asked the Court to subpoena 
Gary, the dispatcher, and John, the guard of the trucking yard. If called as a 
witness, John would testify that Mr. Atkins had not been in the truck yard until 
he arrived early one morning to drive the truck to the United States and that Mr. 
Atkins did not touch or unroll the tarps before he left the truck yard that 
morning. John did not want to voluntarily travel to the United States to testify 
because he feared that his company would fire him if he testified on Mr. Atkins' 
behalf. John believed that someone from the company may have known about 
the drugs that were in the tarps. He did not want to lose his job. He would only 
appear if he received a subpoena. 
The judge denied Mr. Atkins' request. Although he determined that the 
testimony of Gary and John would be material and relevant, the judge stated that 
his subpoena power did not extend beyond the border. If Mr. Atkins wanted to 
present the testimony of his witnesses, the judge stated that he would be willing 
to send a diplomatic request to a Canadian court asking it to take the testimony 
of the two witnesses in Canada. However, this diplomatic process, known as 
letters rogatory, could take years to complete and there was no guarantee the 
Canadians would agree. 
Mr. Atkins then asked the government for help. The government had the 
power to compel the appearance of Mr. Atkins' witnesses in the United States 
under the provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United 
States and Canada. The treaty requires the signatories to provide evidence, 
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including witness testimony, for use in a foreign jurisdiction upon a proper 
government request. In other words, the treaty creates transnational compulsory 
process. The government refused to make the request on Mr. Atkins' behalf. 
However, the government did invoke the treaty to obtain its own evidence from 
Canada. 
Because Mr. Atkins was in custody and had no funds to post blail, he had an 
untenable choice to make: remain in custody for what could be years while the 
diplomatic process proceeded, or go to trial without his witnesses. He proceeded 
to trial, and testified on his own behalf. However, in the face of his 
uncorroborated testimony, he was convicted. 
B. Scenario Two: The Man with a New suitcase4 
John Smith was exhausted but happy to arrive back home in Seattle after a 
two-week vacation in Mexico. The past 24 hours had been rough. His suitcase 
had been stolen the night before his departure, leaving him desperately searching 
for new luggage in the few hours remaining before his flight home. Luckily, he 
found the time to purchase new luggage at a large open air market and to file a 
police report for his lost luggage in Mexico. He had noticed a chemical smell 
emanating from his new suitcase, but he did not have time to be picky. He 
dismissed the smell, chalking it up to the suitcase being new. A Mexican citizen 
named Michael Ortiz had first-hand knowledge of these events. Ortiz had helped 
Smith place an advertisement in a Mexican newspaper requesting return of his 
stolen luggage and had helped Smith pack the new suitcase. 
While drinking a coffee during a layover in Texas, Smith did not know that 
airport officials were checking all in-transit luggage for contraband. As he 
dreamt about sleeping in his own bed for the first time in two weeks, his suitcase 
aroused suspicion because of a strong chemical odor emanating from it. The 
police opened his suitcase but found nothing unusual inside. The police then 
tested a fragment of the suitcase itself. That fragment tested positive for cocaine, 
The police checked the identification tag and found Smith's name and address. 
Upon exiting his plane at the Seattle-Tacoma airport, John Smith was arrested. 
He was subsequently charged with knowingly importing cocaine into the United 
States. 
Pretrial, Smith requested the aid of the prosecutor and the Court in 
compelling the testimony of Ortiz and the police report from Mexico. The 
prosecutor refused. He said that he was under no obligation to utilize the 
existing treaty between the United States and Mexico to request evidence on 
Smith's behalf. The Court stated that although the requested evidence was 
relevant and material, his subpoena power did not extend to Mexico and thus, he 
could not compel Ortiz to appear or the Mexican government to release the 
4. The inspiration for this scenario originated from the facts of United States v. Filippi, 91 8 
F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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police report. The Court suggested that Smith request the evidence through 
diplomatic channels, although the Court acknowledged it might be years before 
the Mexican government responded, if it responded at all. 
Smith proceeded to trial without the witness or the document. He testified 
to these facts, but his testimony was uncorroborated. The jury convicted him. 
The danger of inaccurate verdicts and wrongful convictions that result from 
unequal access to evidence highlights the need to resolve this flawed 
transnational adjudication process, and specifically, its evidentiary method. 
Failure to do so results in cognizable deprivations to our system of criminal 
justice in general and to defendants in particular, whether the high-profile 
alleged "terrorist" or the less provocative, but far more common, truck driver or 
traveler. As recognized by the Supreme Court over 30 years ago: 
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that 
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by 
the prosecution or by the defen~e.~ 
MLATs create inequities in evidence-gathering capabilities that affect the 
accuracy of criminal trials by distorting the evidence available to fact-finders. 
When the ability to compel evidence is unequal, accuracy and fairness norms, 
such as punishing the guilty and freeing the innocent, can be illusory. 
How to attain equity and fairness in an adversarial system is a perennial 
question of criminal procedure in the United States. Scholars seeking an answer 
often turn to social norm theory: legal liberalism: or formalism. No criminal 
process scholar explicitly utilizes the comparative institutional analysis 
framework to examine criminal process questions. While these other theories 
can identify aspirational social justice and equality norms, only comparative 
5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709 (1974). 
6 .  For example, a social norm theorist would argue that the courts should not restrict the 
ability of a frictionless political process to define the appropriate limits of law enforcement behavior. 
See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A 
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1988 U .  CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (1998), Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. 
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998). When the political 
process has struck the balance between individual rights and effective law enforcement, courts 
should not substitute their decision-making for that of the political process. 
7. A legal liberalist would argue that the courts must define the appropriate limits of political 
action. See generally William H .  Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist 
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004) (critiquing legal liberalists' 
reliance upon the courts). For both social norm and legal liberalism theorists, it is the goal that 
animates institutional choice. 
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institutional analysis determines whether the courts, the political process, or the 
market is the best institution to achieve them. The examination of criminal 
process questions in the United States should be enlightened by understanding 
each institution's competence and ability compared to that of the others and 
understanding the interactions amongst them. 
Resolving the disparity in the ability to compel foreign evidence is difficult 
in light of relative congressional indifference and the lasting reverberations of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Scholars argue that inequities in the 
power to produce evidence created by MLATs violate the ~onstitution.~ 
Scholarly approaches, however, either fail to explore the question of institutional 
choice or consider it as an af te r th~u~ht .~  This Article considers how 
comparative institutional analysis can inform the question of how to obtain 
compulsion equity in transnational criminal cases adjudicated in the United 
States. The relevant decision-makers for purposes of comparison are the Senate, 
which ratifies the treaties, the executive10 that negotiates them, the courts, and 
the evidence gathering market.ll This Article concludes that the best solution 
for remedying the compulsion disparity in transnational evidence gathering is 
for courts to establish a moderate right to compulsion parity. 
Compulsion disparities undermine the very legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. In the absence of parity, there can be no confidence that criminal 
adjudications result in reliable outcomes. By analyzing the question of unequal 
access to evidence in transnational cases, this Article demonstrates the utility of 
comparative institutional analysis for analyzing criminal process issues 
generally, by illuminating institutional considerations that transcend this 
particular setting. 
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part I1 describes the comparative 
8. See, e.g., Ian Conner, Peoples Divided: The AppIcation of United States Constitutional 
Protections in International Criminal Law Enforcement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 495 (2002). 
9. See, e.g., Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the 
Constitution Come Along? 39 HouS. L. REV. 307 (2002); 3 MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, RIMINAL, OBTAINING EVIDENCE: CRIMINAL, 412-3-3, at 
87 (1990). 
10. The executive is shorthand for federal prosecutors, State Department officials, 
representatives from the Attorney Generals office, and various administrative agencies, all of whom 
were involved in negotiating these treaties. See ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL AW ENFORCEMENT 324 (1997). 
11. The term market is employed to describe the actions parties in a criminal case take to meet 
their demand for foreign evidence and to affect the supply of evidence available to the other party. 
The manner in which these parties interact with each other and with domestic or foreign entities to 
negotiate the provision of evidence can be termed "transactions" since they involve the transfer of 
goods, for example, evidence. In the evidence-gathering market, each party is acting selfishly, but 
from these actions there "emerges a structure that affects and constrains them all. Once formed, a 
market becomes a force in itseIf, and a force that the constitutive units acting singly or in small 
numbers cannot control." Kenneth N. Waltz, TKEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 24-26 (1979) 
cited in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 1,13 (1999). 
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institutional analysis framework and its application to criminal process 
questions. Part I11 contextualizes application of the framework by exploring the 
norm of compulsion parity. Part IV discusses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs), a mechanism for regularizing foreign evidence-gathering, and 
explains how the treaties create a compulsion disparity in the United States 
between the government and criminal defendants in their ability to gather 
foreign evidence. Part V examines the relative merits and disadvantages of the 
market, the political process, the executive, and the courts for resolving the 
compulsion disparity created by MLATs. Finally, Part V1 concludes with a 
recommendation for the institutional approach best suited to rectify the current 
disparity in the transnational criminal process. 
11. 
THE VALUE OF CHOICE: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO CRIMINAL PROCESS QUESTIONS 
A. The Framework in General 
As developed by Neil Komesar, the comparative institutional analysis 
framework addresses the question of how to decide which institution12 is best 
equipped to achieve a desired policy or goal.13 Rather than focusing on what the 
best policy is or what the law should be,14 the framework spotlights the 
12. The term 'institution" is used in this Article in its narrow sense to describe "large-scale 
social decision-making processes-markets, communities, political processes, and courts." NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 3 1 (2001) 
[hereinafter LAW'S LIMITS]. An alternative view held by institutional economists and social 
scientists, understands institutions as the rules that govern or constrain decisions. Under this view, 
institutions have three primary characteristics: formal rules (for example, judicial or political rules), 
informal rules (for example, custom) and enforcement mechanisms for enforcing those rules. See, 
e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1990). These characteristics of institutions are the determinants of market activity. 
13. Komesar draws from the works of Ronald Coase and Mancur Olsen. See NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 8, 29-30 (1994) [hereinafter IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES]. Coase's work demonstrates that 
public policy analysis which assumes a frictionless market or government response is not useful 
since perfect (frictionless) institutional choices do not exist. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J .  L. & ECON 1 (1960). According to Coase, 
[Tlhere is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply 
because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactory views 
on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms 
and governments handle the problem of harmful effects. 
Id. at 18. According to Komesar, the "call for comparative institutional analysis inherent in 
Coase's work seems not to have been heeded." IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13 at 29. 
Komesar's emphasis on the distribution of stakes can be traced to Olsen's work on collective action. 
See LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 30-31 11.23, (citing MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)); IMPERFECTALTERNATNES, Supra note 13 at 8 n.3 (same). 
14. Comparative institutional analysis does not inform goal choice. IMPERFECT 
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institutions that make the decisions. Institutional choice should play a central 
role in determining how to attain a desired goal because it will determine the 
efficacy of the approach to that goal. 
The framework takes for granted that all institutions are imperfect-that 
there is no universal first and best institutional choice for every desired goal or 
legal problem.15 Rather, all institutions are affected by similar dynamics 
because "institutions tend to move together."16 The same systemic factors that 
cause malfunctions or failures in one institution may similarly cause 
malfunctions in others.17 Accepting that all institutions can fail under similar 
circumstances, the choice amongst them requires a comparison to determine 
which is least likely to fail in a given context. 
Under comparative institutional analysis, the appropriate question is not 
whether a particular institution works better in one setting than in another.18 
Rather, the correct question is whether, in any given setting, one institution is 
better or worse than its available alternatives.19 Once a goal is identified, "the 
task is to choose among imperfect alternatives" on the basis of comparison.20 
Sometimes application of the fiamework will reveal an obvious institutional 
choice. At other times, when the issues are complex and involve large numbers 
of relevant the answer may entail difficult institutional 
compromises. Thus, comparative analysis does not always provide easy 
answers.22 However, defining a role for an institution in the absence of a 
comparative approach may exacerbate existing institutional malfunctions or may 
lead to counter-intuitive results. 
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 4-5, 48, 49-50. Rather, application of the framework usually 
occurs after an analyst has already identified a desired policy or value. Some scholars have critiqued 
the framework on this basis. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 514 n.22 (2000) ("Komesar gives 
only limited attention to how goal choices are made and how they fit into the process of policy 
analysis."); Thomas W. Memll, Institutional Choice andPolitica1 Faith, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 959, 
988 (1997) (critiquing Komesar's failure to emphasize goal choice as a critical component to 
comparative institutional analysis). Others have applied the framework to the question of goal 
choice. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, Contested Social Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28 HAWAII L. 
REV. 23 (2005) (arguing that the choice of social goals is contested and can be analyzed utilizing a 
comparative institutional analysis framework). This Article does not join this discussion. 
15. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 174-75. 
16. Id. at 23-29, 176; IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 23. 
17. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 3,4, 176. 
18. IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 6. 
19. Id. 
20. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanaljsb of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393,1407 (1996). 
21. Institutional performance is linked to variation in the numbers of relevant participants and 
the complexity of the issues involved. hcreases in numbers and complexity adversely affect the 
performance of most institutions. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 23,25. 
22. Id. at 177-180. 
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B. The Role of Courts 
Courts play a critical role in institutional choice because they determine 
which institution will decide a particular issue through the doctrinal rules or 
standards they create. Sometimes a court's institutional choices are explicit. 
More often, however, they are implicit in the court's decision.23 
Courts make institutional decisions by defining the character of rights.24 
They can create strong rights, moderate rights or no rights at all. The character 
of the right represents a different institutional choice. 
A court creates "strong rights and certain remedies"25 when it chooses to 
undo a decision made by another institution in favor of its own judgment.26 
When courts define strong rights, they create easily applied doctrinal rules27 and 
then leave implementation to other institutions. In the criminal process context, 
the rule that indigent defendants have a right to appointed counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions is an example of a strong right with a certain remedy.28 If counsel 
is not provided, the conviction will be reversed. The decision of how to 
implement the right is left to the political process.29 Strong rights entail 
"significant judicial activism7730 because the court substitutes its decision for 
those made by other institutions without creating a concomitant increase in its 
workload, thus leaving the task of how to effectuate the right to other 
 institution^.^ 
2. Moderate Rights 
A court defines moderate rights when it decides that it is better suited to 
23. Id. at 4-5, 19-20. 
24. Id at 5. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 19. Komesar likens the distinction between judicial activism and judicial activity to 
the traditional dichotomy between rules and standards. Id. at 5. Both the strongest and weakest 
judicial activism are found in rules that involve limited judicial activity. These rules allocate 
significant responsibility away from the courts to other institutions such as the market or the political 
process. Id. Moderate rights involve standards and judicial balancing and therefore require the most 
judicial activity. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
29. In this case, state legislatures had to determine how to h d  indigent defense counsel in 
order to effectuate this newly created right. 
30. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 5. For example, in Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, the Court held 
that an indigent defendant had a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions despite a Florida law 
that only allowed for the appointment of counsel to indigents in capital cases. 
3 1. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 5. 
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determine how to implement the right than other  institution^.^^ Instead of 
employing a doctrinal rule, it creates a more flexible standard that it will apply 
on a case by case basis.33 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the 
reach of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is an example of a moderate 
right?4 Rather than creating a rule that all violations of the Fourth Amendment 
require suppression of evidence in all instances, the Court created a standard 
which balances the "costs" of exclusion against the "benefits" derived from that 
excl~sion?~ The court's workload increases because it conducts the balancing 
case by case. As such, the right is weaker and there is more uncertainty about 
the law.36 
3. No Rights 
Finally, a court can take a hands-off approach and decide not to create any 
rights or remedies at all, leaving decision-making entirely to other  institution^.^^ 
The rule that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to discovery is an 
example of a doctrinal rule with no concomitant right.38 Courts frequently create 
a rule without a right3' because their limited resources and personnel prevent 
them fi-om reviewing all governmental action.40 In the "no rights" situation, both 
judicial activism and judicial activity are at their lowest?l 
C. Application to Criminal Process Questions 
Outside the criminal procedure context, scholars recognize comparative 
institutional analysis as a useful theory for analyzing law, rights, and the role of 
courts in supplying the demand for law and  right^?^ However, no criminal 
32. Id. at 5,19. 
33. Id. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
35. Id. 
36. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 19. 
37. Id. at 19-20. 
38. See, e.g., Weatherfordv. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). 
39. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 11. ("Judges are asked to decide who will decide basic 
substantive decisions. Rather than directly addressing these substantive decisions, courts funnel most 
of them elsewhere.") 
40. Id. at 3,4, 176; See also Neil K .  Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the 
Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 663 (1988) [hereinafter A 
Job jbr Judges] ("The physical capacity of the courts to review governmental action is simply 
dwarfed by the capacity of governments to produce such action."); IMPERFECT ALTERNATIWS, 
supra note 13, at 128-38; LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 26. 
41. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 19-20. 
42. See, e.g., Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 11 (international law); Jill E. Fisch, The 
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U .  CIN. L. REV. 
1061 (2000) (corporate law); Daniel H. Cole, The Importance of Being Comparative, 33 IND. L. 
REV. 921 (2W) (environmental law); Lany I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 
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process scholar explicitly utilizes comparative institutional analysis to examine 
criminal process questions. Instead, some scholars are quick to propose a 
doctrinal rule to serve a procedural goal without considering whether the 
adjudicative process is best equipped to achieve that Others suggest 
ways in which different institutions could achieve a desired policy without 
comparing the relative merits of those  institution^.^^ Simply cataloging the 
available institutions without engaging in any comparison amongst them leaves 
unanswered the question of which institution will best serve the desired policy. 
Other scholars simply ignore questions of institutional choice. This oversight is 
a mistake. The comparative framework is an ideal methodology for analyzing 
criminal process issues. 
The lack of attention to the comparative framework by criminal process 
scholars could be "animated by a deep aversion to a particular institution and a 
deep conviction that the goal they have espoused will insulate them from this 
ir~stitution."~~ For example, some criminal process scholars believe the political 
process rarely protects the rights of criminal  defendant^.^^ They are more 
confident that the courts are the best champions of justice for unpopular 
groups.47 While evidence exists to support this view, overburdened courts may 
perform no better than the malfunctioning political process to meet the demand 
for rights. 
The question of institutional choice often seems obvious in the criminal 
36 HOUS. L. REV. 1609 (1999) (patient's rights); David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing 
Protected Clms: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Afirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 657 (2000) (affirmative action); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of 
Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 (1999) (separation of powers); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment 
Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1645 (1996) (labor law); Arti K. Rai, 
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 827 (1999) (intellectual property); Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex 
Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Peifect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. OL. 
& Crv. RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998) (family law); Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, 
Student-Athletes, and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 
1995 WIS. L. REV. 545 (1995) (sports law); Buzbee, supra note 14 (urban sprawl); Ted Schneyer, 
Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation ofLawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996) (legal 
ethics); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections 
on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398 (2007) (business judgment 
rule). 
43. See, e.g., Lenese C .  Herbert, Bete Noir: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National 
Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149 (2003). 
44. See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 9. 
45. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 174. For the legal liberalist, mistrust of the political 
process makes it unnecessary to analyze whether that institution would be better suited to achieve 
the desired goal in certain situations. For the social norm theorist, the belief that the courts hinder 
communities of color from political self-determination in attempting to control the violence in their 
communities obviates the need to determine whether the adjudicative process could better serve the 
desires of these communities. 
46. See, e.g., David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A 
Response to the New CriminalJusiiceScholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1 999). 
47. Id. 
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process context because defendants in a criminal case are already before the 
courts and will remain there until the case is resolved. Thus, the courts appear to 
be the clear institutional choice to attain a desired criminal process goal. In 
seeking ways to protect individual rights against government overreaching, 
criminal process scholars often examine ways in which the courts can provide 
the necessary protection without explicitly considering whether the courts are 
the institution best equipped to do so. This decision makes sense because courts 
have traditionally been the bulwark against excesses of govement power. 
However, courts make institutional choices when they define the character 
of rights.48 Courts may not create the strong right that is sought because of their 
institutional limitations. Instead of turning blindly to the courts to address 
criminal process questions, scholars must compare several alternative decision- 
makers. Depending upon the goal sought, the institutions of criminal process 
include the political process, the courts, the executive (including prosecutors), 
defendants, juries, and administrative agencies. It is critical to examine and 
compare the competence of these institutions to resolve a process issue because 
this analysis may reveal that an institution other than the court is best suited to 
achieve the desired policy or goal. 
Achieving compulsion parity between prosecutors and defendants in their 
ability to gather evidence located outside the United States is an important 
criminal process goal in the era of global crime. Currently, MLATs only allow 
prosecutors to obtain foreign evidence. This Article considers how the 
comparative framework would approach and resolve the question of attaining 
compulsion equity in transnational criminal cases. Since the framework does not 
address the question of goal choice?9 Part I11 discusses the importance of the 
norm of compulsion parity by examining its historical and current formulations. 
It is an "ancient proposition7' that in a trial, "the public . . . has a right to 
every man's evidence, except for those persons protected by a constitutional, 
common-law, or statutory privilege."50 The "very integrity" of the judicial 
process as well as public confidence in the system depends upon full disclosure 
of evidence.51 For these reasons, both prosecutors and defendants have the right 
to compulsory process. Eliminating this right has the "effect of suppressing the 
truth."52 To ensure that the criminal process can reliably free the innocent and 
punish the guilty, both parties should have compulsion parity, for example, the 
48. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text. 
49. See supra note 14. 
50. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709 (citations omitted). 
51. Id. at 708-9. 
52. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,20 (1967). 
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equal ability to compel the production of evidence that is relevant and material 
so that it can be presented to the trier of fact.53 Subpart A addresses the 
historical evolution of the norm of compulsion parity and Subpart B addresses 
its current formulation. 
A. Historical E~olution 
Compulsion parity is a value deeply rooted in our constitutional hist01-y.~~ 
In England, before the establishment of coercive means for securing the 
presence of favorable witnesses, innocent defendants went to their deaths.55 The 
English parliament remedied this injustice in 1695 when it passed a statute 
granting defendants charged with treason the same subpoena power available to 
the prosecution.56 The principle of parity was well-established by the time 
Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the Laws of England shortly before the 
American Revolution. He wrote, "[the defendant] shall have the same 
compulsive process to bring in his witnesses for him, as was usual to compel 
their appearance against him."57 
The American colonists brought with them memories of the dangers of a 
justice system without compulsion parity.58 William Penn's experience in 
England provides a compelling example. Penn was arrested in 1670 for 
delivering a sermon to an unlawful assembly of ~ u a k e r s . ~ ~  His trial proceeded 
in his absence after he was removed from the courtroom. He had attempted to 
defend himself without the assistance of an attorney and without the ability to 
compel the testimony of witnesses on his behalf. Penn was eventually acquitted 
by a jury that ignored the judge's instructions to convict. Later, when he became 
53. The international community likewise recognizes the importance of compulsion parity. 
Article 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(e), entered 
infoforce Mar. 23, 1976,999 U.N.T.S. 171. The United States became a p a q  the Covenant in 1992. 
54. See Akhil Amar, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Foreward: Sixth 
Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641,699 (1996) ("Though the words of the Compulsory 
Process Clause do not, on their face, demand a parity reading, the established Anglo-American right 
that the clause meant to declare was clearly defined in terms of subpoena parity"); Richard A. 
Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (1999) ("The 
Compulsory Process Clause, at the very least, requires the government to permit criminal defendants 
to avail themselves of the same rules of process-in the literal sense of service of process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in court-as are available to the prosecution"). 
55. Peter Westen, The Compulsov Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71,85 (1974). 
56. Id. at 89. This "landmark English Treason Act of 1696 gave defendants 'the like Processe. 
. . to compell their Witnesses. . . as is usually granted to compell Witnesses to appeare against 
them.. .."' See Amar, supra note 56, at 699-700 (citation omitted). 
57. Westen, supra note 57, at 90 (citation omitted). 
58. Id. at 97-98 & n. 1 14. 
59. Id.at91. 
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founder of the Pennsylvania colony, Penn included both compulsory process and 
compulsion parity in that state's Charter of ~iberties.~' The provision provided 
that "all criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Counsel as 
their prosecutors."61 
Most state constitutions protected the right to compulsory process, 
including parity.62 New Jersey's State Constitution of 1776, for example, gave 
the accused "'the same privileges of witnesses . . . as their prosecutors are or 
shall be entitled to."63 The common principle in early American formulations of 
the right to compulsory process was that defendants should have at least the 
same rights as the prosecution to compel witnesses to testify on their behalf.64 
Compulsory process, including parity, was so important to the states that it 
was protected in the Constitution under the Sixth ~ m e n d m e n t . ~ ~  The
Compulsory Process Clause provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor."66 Though the Clause's language does not explicitly require parity, its 
history demonstrates that parity is implied. When James Madison drafted the 
clause, most state provisions emphasized the defendant's right to present 
evidence on a par with the prosecution. Only two states, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, emphasized the subpoena power.67 Madison, a consensus builder, 
likely draRed the Clause to specifically emphasize the minority view so as to 
ensure it would not be overlooked. He believed his language would implicitly 
protect the "more conspicuous and common aspects of the defendant's right to 
present witnesses in his favor[,]" including parity.68 
60. He also included a provision in the governing laws protecting the right of defendants to 
present a defense. Id. at 91-92. 
61. Id. at 92-93 (citing Act of May 31, 1718, 1 Laws of Pennsylvania, ch. 236 sec. 4 (Bioren 
ed. 18101. 
62. Westen, supra note 57, at 90-91, 94-95; Amar, supra note 56, at 699-700. 
63. Westen, supra note 57, at 95; Amar, supra note 56, at 699-700. 
64. Westen, supra note 57, at 95. 
65. Id. at 94-95 (footnotes omitted) ("[State provisions] all reflected the principle that the 
defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the 
prosecution, to establish the essential elements of his case. The states pressed the principle so 
vigorously that the framers of the federal Bill of Rights included it in the sixth amendment in a 
distinctive formulation of their own."). 
66. For a brief discussion of the history of the Campulsory Process Clause, see Lisa Graver, 
The Current Value of Compulsoty Process: Can a Defendant Compel the Admission of Favorable 
Scientijic Testimony? 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865,868-870 (1998). 
67. Westen, supra note 57, at 94-95 nn.96 & 99. 
68. Id. at 99-100. The language of the compulsory process clause was widely publicized. If 
state representatives from the majority states had thought the language was narrowly limited to the 
subpwna power, they likely would have raised the issue. Id. at 100. None did because of their belief 
that Madison's language was implicitly as broad as their comparable state provisions. Id. 
When the first congress statutorily implemented the compulsory process clause in 1790, it gave the 
clause a broader meaning than the subpoena power. Id. The statute provided that a person accused of 
treason: 
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B. Current Formulation 
There are very few cases construing the Sixth Amendment's compulsory 
process clause. Washington v. Texas is the first.69 In Washington, two Texas 
statutes barred persons charged or convicted as co-participants in the same crime 
from testifying for each other. However, the statute did not bar their testimony 
on behalf of the prosecution because of the belief that co-accuseds would lie 
only when called by the defense. Finding this reasoning arbitrary, the Court held 
that Washington was denied his compulsory process right to put a witness on the 
stand whose testimony would be relevant and material to the defense.70 In so 
holding, Chief Justice Warren wrote, 
[Tlhe Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary specifically to provide that 
defendants in criminal cases should be provided the means of obtaining witnesses 
so that their own evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be evaluated by the 
jury. 71 
shall be allowed and admitted in his said defence to make any proof that he or they 
can produce, by lawful witness or witnesses, and shall have like process of the court 
where he or they shall be tried, to compel his or their witnesses to appear at his or their 
trial, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on the prosecution against 
them. 
Act of April 30, 1790, ch 9,29, 1 Stat. 112, 119, cited in Richard A. Nagareda, supra note 
56, at 11 17. 
Westen concludes, "compulsory process by 1791 represented the culmination of a long-evolving 
principle that the defendant should have a meaningful opportunity, at least on a par with that of the 
prosecution, to present a case in his favor through witnesses." Westen, supra note 57, at 77-78. 
According to Wigmore, in his Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, the reference to "compulsory 
process" in the Sixth Amendment "provided nothing new or exceptional"; it merely "gave solid 
sanction, in the special case of accused persons, to the procedure ordinarily practised and recognized 
for witnesses in general." 3 John Henry Wigmore, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 2190,2965 (1st ed. 1904). 
69. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
70. Id. at 23. . 
71. Id. at 20. In his concurrence in Washington, Justice Harlan viewed the case, not as one 
implicating compulsory process rights, but rather, one implicating due process guarantees. He 
concluded that the Texas statute violated due process because the State recognized the relevance and 
competence of a co-accused's testimony, but arbitrarily barred the defendant from being able to use 
this testimony. Id. at 23. As with the compulsory process clause, non-arbitrary exclusion of defense 
evidence does not violate due process. See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1976) ("The 
introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the State for a 'valid' reason.. ."). 
When defendants are deprived of their ability to present a defense, absent a persuasive reason, the 
courts have found a violation of due process, see, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); 
compulsory process, see, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. 14; or both, see, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683 (1986). In Crane, the state was able to present the defendant's confession but the defense 
was excluded from presenting evidence that would have tested the confession. Because neither the 
judge nor the prosecution could provide a rational justification for the exclusion, due process and 
compulsory process were violated. Id. at 690, 691. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), 
Ritchie claimed he was prevented from learning the names of witnesses in his favor as well as other 
evidence because of the trial court's failure to disclose the contents of an agency's child abuse file. 
He claimed entitlement to the State's assistance in uncovering arguably useful information. The 
Court stated that the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause to this type 
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The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that compulsion parity is 
required by the Compulsory Process Clause. However, the Court acknowledges 
that the Clause's history reflects the Framers' intent to provide an accused with 
rights equal to that of the prosecution to compel witnesses and evidence.72 
The Compulsory Process Clause is an essential safeguard for protecting the 
innocent and pursuing the truth in our adversarial system of criminal justice.73 It 
not only grants defendants the right to compel witnesses to appear, but also the 
right to present their testimony74 and to compel documentary and physical 
evidence.75 The Clause implicitly requires parity between defendants and 
of claim was unsettled. Instead, the Court adopted a due process analysis since its precedents 
addressing fundamental fairness of trials established a clear framework for the analysis. The Court 
stated, "[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the 
government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt." Id, at 56. It does not 
matter whether it is the prosecution (see, e.g., Crane, 476 U.S. 673), the judge (see, e.g., Webb, 409 
U.S. 95), or a statute (see, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. 14, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973)) that denies defendants their ability to present a defense. The denial still violates due process. 
72. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 n. 13 (1988) (citing Westen, The 
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 94-95 (1974) (footnotes omitted) ("[State 
provisions] all reflected the principle that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least 
as advantageous as that possessed by the prosecution, to establish the essential elements of his case. 
The states pressed the principle so vigorously that the framers of the federal Bill of Rights included 
it in the sixth amendment in a distinctive formulation of their own.")). In Taylor, the Court upheld a 
trial court's order precluding a defense witness because of the lawyer's failure to give the 
government sufficient notice of his witness as required by statute. The Court found that witness 
preclusion under the circumstances of this case did not violate the Compulsory Process Clause. 
However, the Court did acknowledge: 
[Tlhe conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by 
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to 
have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such 
testimony to Ibe determined by the jury or by the court. . . . [W]e believe that [this] 
reasoning [is] required by the Sixth Amendment. 
Id. at 408 (citation omitted)(edits in original). 
73. See Amar, supra note 56, at 642 (1996) ("The deep principles underlying the Sixth 
Amendment's three clusters and many clauses [and, I submit, underlying constitutional criminal 
procedure generally] are the protection of innocence and the pursuit of truth."). 
74. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (The framers of the Sixth Amendment "did not intend to 
commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose 
testimony he had no right to use."). 
75. The use of the word "witnesses" in the Clause includes both witnesses who furnish 
evidence through testimony as well as those who furnish evidence by producing documents and 
other items. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-55 (2000) (Thomas, J. concurring). 
According to Justice Thomas, this "broad view of the term 'witness' in the compulsory process 
context dates back at least to the beginning of the 18th century. Id. at 54 n.4 (citation omitted). See 
also United States v. Bun; 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807), cited with approval in 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 54-55. During his treason trial, Aaron Burr sought the issuance of a subpoena 
duces Cecum to compel President Jefferson to provide the letter that purported to contain 
incriminating evidence against Burr. Chief Justice Marshall, presiding as a circuit judge, rejected the 
government's argument that the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause only permitted the 
defendant to compel witness testimony, but not documents. The court held that the right to 
compulsory process included the right to secure papers material to the defense. Id. at 55. 
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prosecutors. However, as discussed in Part IVY the norm of compulsion parity 
has not kept pace with the rise of global crime76 as a result of the powerful 
MLAT. 
IV. 
MUTUAL EGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AND THE RETRENCHMENT OF 
COMPULSION PARITY 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are bi-lateral treaties that facilitate the 
gathering of evidence from foreign locales. However, MLATs fail to achieve 
accuracy and reliability in criminal adjudications because they create 
transnational compulsory process solely for prosecutors. Subpart A discusses the 
necessity of MLATs in an era of global crime and Subpart B describes their 
function. 
A. Necessity of MLATs 
Long before the global war on terror began in earnest after the events of 
September 11, the exponential growth of transnational crime was a government 
concern.77 That concern has not abated. In a June 2006 speech in Israel, former 
76. Advances in technology and modes of travel facilitate the commission of crimes across 
international borders. See Nancy Guffey-Landers, Establishing an International Criminul Court: 
Will it do Justice?, 20 MD. J .  INT'L L. & TRADE 199 (1996) (arguing that technology and advanced 
modes of travel have increased the possibility of crimes being committed across borders such as 
drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism and human rights violations). Drug trafficking, money 
laundering, and international organized crime are just a few of the crimes that are increasingly 
perpetrated on global scale. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Time for 
Final Action on 18 U.S.C. sec 3292,21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941,946 (2000) (establishing that the three 
factors most cited for explaining the growing globalization of crime are narcotics, banking secrecy 
and technology); Ellen Podger, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325 (1997) (discussing the expansion of federal white collar prosecutions 
involving international activities); Thomas G. Snow, Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: The 
Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, International  challenge.^ and the Legal Tools 
Available to Address Them, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 209-210 (2002) (noting that 
contemporary white collar crime is now a transnational crime because of increased use of 
international financial systems to commit the crime); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 
1056 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought, 
successfully, to hold foreign nationals criminally liable under federal laws for conduct committed 
entirely beyond the territorial limits of the United States that nevertheless has effects in this 
country."). See also Christopher M. Pilkerton, The Bite of the Apple: The Use of Narcotics-Related 
Foreign Wiretap Evidence in New York City Courts, 11 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 103 (2001) ("The 
global trade of drug trafficking currently poses the most serious threat U.S. law enforcement has 
ever had to combat."). 
77. See, e.g., The White House, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY 15-25 (1998) 
(describing international crime threat resulting from transnational drug trafficking, smuggling of 
illegal goods and undocumented immigrants, money laundering, and piracy of intellectual property) 
cited in Diane Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an 
Infernational Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809,820 n.75 (2000). Former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh 
stated, "Often, more than 50 percent of my day is devoted to some matter relating to our 
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Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales articulated a vision that remains 
committed to stomping out transnational crime: 
[Dlespite the tremendous demands on the Department in the post-911 1 world, our 
commitment to fighting crime has never been stronger. We are cooperating with 
our intemational partners to fight everything from organized crime and drug 
trafficking to cybercrime, human trafficking, corruption and intellectual property 
crimes. We are working as a team, and we are making good progress.78 
Domestic prosecution of transnational crime presents challenges. The 
parties commonly require evidence located in a foreign jurisdiction in a form 
admissible in American courts. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials on the 
one hand and accused individuals on the other must both contend with issues of 
national sovereignty and alien legal systems that impede their ability to acquire 
that evidence. When evidence necessay to effectively prosecute or defend is 
located in a foreign jurisdiction, there exist two significant hurdles to obtaining 
it. The first obstacle is the need to respect sovereignty. Absent a treaty or other 
agreement between nations, the jurisdiction of law enforcement agents does not 
extend beyond a nation's borders.79 Laws often forbid unilateral law 
enforcement activities by foreign agents.80 Beyond U.S. borders, American 
subpoenas for evidence have no effect. Hence, sovereignty hinders law 
enforcement's ability to gather and seize foreign evidence. 
The second obstacle is the difficulty of harmonizings1 different legal 
systems, cultures, and customs. For example, nations differ in the acts they 
decide to ~riminalize,~~ the techniques law enforcement can utilize,83 the laws 
international involvement in fighting drug trafficking, money laundering, intemational organized 
crime and business fraud, environmental depredations, terrorism or espionage." Address by Attorney 
General Dick Thornburgh, American Bar Association annual meeting (Aug. 8, 1989), quofed in 
Michael Burke, United States v. Salim: A Harbinger for Federal Prosecutions Using Depositions 
Taken Abroad, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, n.4 (1990). 
78. Excerpted from Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at Malka 
Brender Hall "Kes Hamishpat" Trubowitz Law Building, Tel Aviv University (June 27, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2OO6/ag~speech~O6O627.ht~. 
79. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 5. 
80. Id. at 5,33 1. See, e.g., Art. 271 of the Swiss Penal Code (cited in NADELMANN, supra note 
10, at 331 n.47): 
Whoever, on Swiss territory, without being authorized so to do, takes on behalf of a 
foreign government any action which is solely within the province of a [Swiss] 
government authority or a [Swiss] government official, whoever does anything to 
encourage such action, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the 
penitentiary. . . . 
For a discussion of similar restrictions in other nations, see Sharon DeVine and Christine 
M. Olsen. Taking Evidence Outside of the UnitedStafes, 55 B.U. L. REV. 368,386 (1975). 
81. Nadelmann describes harmonization as a concept that incorporates three processes: the 
"replarization of relations among law enforcement officials of different states, [the] 
accommodation among systems that retain their essential differences, and [the] homogenization of 
systems toward a common norm." NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 10 (emphasis in original). 
82. Many American tax and securities law violations are not criminal in other nations. 
83. Typical techniques used in the United States such as wire-tapping and undercover 
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and legal procedures available for obtaining evidence, and the infrastructures 
governing whether evidence will be provided. MLATs were negotiated with 
foreign nations to overcome these obstacles. 
B. Function of ML,ATs 
MLATs create transnational compulsory process between nations.84 They 
are bi-lateral in order to specifically tailor each treaty to account for differing 
legal systems and law enforcement prioritie~.'~ MLATs mandate mutual 
cooperation between nations in the investigation and prosecution of 
transnational crime. The parties can deny assistance only on the bases explicitly 
set forth in the treaty.86 The primary motivation of the United States to negotiate 
operations are either forbidden or strictly constrained elsewhere. Id. at 7, 209, 225-235, 239-246. 
Many civil law countries operate under the "legality principle," requiring the prosecution of anyone 
known to have committed a crime, and preventing law enforcement from turning individuals into 
informants. See id. at 216,218-19. 
84. MLATs are not the sole means of obtaining evidence abroad. Executive agreements can 
provide limited assistance to investigate specified types of crimes. Executive agreements with 
foreign governments are signed by the President without Senate ratification and bind the country. 
See U.S. CONST. art. 11, $2; Guffey-Landers, supra note 78, at 209. 
In addition to MLATs and executive agreements, various multilateral arrangements exist. For 
example, the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances provides for mutual legal assistance in Article 7. This treaty entered into force in 1988. 
Under the Convention, a nation may request mutual legal assistance for the following reasons: 
Taking evidence or statements from persons; effecting service of judicial documents; 
executing searches and seizures; examining objects and sites; providing information 
and evidentiary items; providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents 
and records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records; identifying or 
tracing proceeds, properly, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes. 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, art. 7(2), openedfor signature Dec. 20, 1988,28 I.L.M. 493,508. The UN Convention 
is silent as to the ability of criminal defendants to use the treaty to obtain evidence on their behalf. 
See Michael Abbell, DOJ Renews Assault on Defendant's Right to Use Treaties to Obtain Evidence 
from Abroad, THE CHAMPION, AUG. 21, 1997, at 21, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/champio11/axtic1es /97aug02.htm. These other methods are of limited utility 
because they only cover certain specified crimes. 
85. Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self- 
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1265 (1998) ("[MLATs] help us 
bridge the gulfs of language, culture and disparate legal systems that in the past hampered 
cooperation in criminal law enforcement" and thus "have vastly improved international collaboration 
in combating crime"); Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting the "Russian Maja": Recent Russian 
Legislation and Increased Bilateral Cooperation May Provide the Means, 37 VA. J .  INT'L L. 191, 
207 (1996). MLATs were structured to streamline and make more effective the process of obtaining 
foreign evidence. See Treaty with Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, US.- 
Austria, at 2, S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-24 (1996) [hereinafter Austria] citing Worldwide Review of 
Status of US. Extradition Treaties and Mutual LegaZ Assistance Treaties: Hearings Before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 36-37 (1987) (statement of Mark M. Richard, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division). 
86. Each MLAT explicitly sets forth the situations in which the requested country can deny 
assistance under the treaty, usually in Article 3. Typically, they allow for the denial of requests that 
appear to involve military or political offenses not recognized under the criminal laws of the 
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these treaties is to facilitate obtaining foreign evidence in a form admissible in 
United States courts.87 
While each MLAT is the product of individual  negotiation^,^^ they do 
contain some similarities. MLATs typically provide for the taking of testimony, 
the production of records, evidence, and information, the service of judicial 
orders, and the transfer of persons in custody for testimonial purposes.89 
MLATs also permit any other assistance not prohibited by the laws of the 
requested nation, allowing the treaties to evolve over timcgO 
MLATs call for the creation of a "Central Authority" in each nation to 
facilitate treaty requeskgl By making requests directly to the Central Authority, 
the courts and diplomatic channels are avoided, and the time required to secure 
evidence is significantly reduced.92 The Office of International Affairs (OIA) in 
the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice serves as the 
Central Authority for the United The OIA was created in 1979, after 
requested state or that would violate the constitution of the requested state. They also permit denials 
when the request would violate the national security or basic public policy of the requested state. 
87. A significant motivation for foreign nations' willingness to negotiate MLATs was a desire 
to reduce unilateral actions taken by the United States to obtain evidence. See, e.g., NADELMANN, 
supra note 10, at 367 (description of Canadian MLAT). 
88. For an in-depth discussion of the negotiation history, see id, at 345-384; Tuerkheimer, 
supra note 9, at 358. 
89. Some types of assistance, such as the transfer of persons in custody for testimonial 
purposes, were not always available through other processes like the diplomatic letters rogatory. The 
types of assistance required by an MLAT are usually documented in the first Article. See, e.g., 
Austria, supra note 87, at 6, providing for the following types of assistance: (1) the taking of 
testimony or statements of persons; (2) service of documents; (3) execution of requests for searches 
and seizures; (4) the provision of documents and other articles of evidence; (5) locating and 
identifying persons; and (6) the transfer of individuals in order to obtain testimony or for other 
purposes. The earliest treaties, like the one with Switzerland, allowed the denial of assistance if the 
crime was not specifically enumerated in the treaty. Hanis, Asia Crime Prevention Foundation 
(ACPF) Lecture: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Necessity, Merits, and Problems Arising in the 
Negotiation Process (2000) [hereinafter Harris Lecture]. Experience proved this limitation to be too 
restrictive, so later treaties included the requirement of dual criminality (the act committed would be 
an offense in both jurisdictions). This too proved to be too restrictive. Most current treaties do not 
provide dual criminality as a basis for denial of assistance. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. See, e.g., Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., art. 28, May 25, 
1973,27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT]. 
92. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 319. See Austria, supra note 87, at 1. The process for 
MLAT requests is incorporated in 28 U.S.C. $ 1782. 
93. The Central Authority for the United States is the Attorney General or his designee. See, 
e.g., Austria, supra note 87, at 14. The OIA was designated as the Central Authority for purposes of 
making and receiving MLAT requests pursuant to 28 C.F.R. $ 0.64-1. This section states: 
The Assistant Attomey General, Criminal Division . . . shall have the authority and 
perform the functions of the "Central Authority" or "Competent Authority" (or like 
designation) under treaties and executive agreements between the United States of 
America and other countries on mutual assistance in criminal matters that designate 
the Attorney General or the Department of Justice as such authority. The Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division, is authorized to re-delegate this authority to the 
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the first MLAT was signed.94 Every U.S. Attorney's Office in the country has 
an "international security coordinator" who is responsible for handling requests 
to or from foreign natiomg5 
MLATs have many advantages. First, evidence can be obtained quickly 
because requests bypass the courts and diplomatic channels.96 Second, MLATs 
establish a procedural framework for ensuring that the evidence will be 
admissible in domestic courts.97 Third, they can provide a mechanism for 
circumventing the financial  secrecy laws that so often frustrate American 
inve~ti~ations?~ Without MLATs, frustration with these laws frequently leads 
the United States to resort to unilateral actions to obtain foreign evidence.99 
Fourth, MLATs can require that the request and the evidence provided be kept 
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Criminal Division, and to the Director and 
Deputy Directors of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division. 
The OIA negotiates MLATs with the State Department. 
www.usdoj.gov/criminals/oia.html. The staff of OIA consists of nearly eighty men and women in 
Washington, D.C. as well as attorneys and associated staff in six foreign countries. Harris Lecture, 
supra note 91. On any given day, they handle about 6,000 requests to and from the US, about two 
thirds of which are requests for mutual assistance. Id. The number of requests grows every year. Id. 
The OIA helps local, state and federal prosecutors make MLAT requests. They will provide model 
requests and help with drafting. UNITED STATES A'ITORNEYS' MANUAL, Title 9, Criminal Resource 
Manual 276 (1997). Once a draft is complete, the OIA sends the final request to the requested 
country's Central Authority. Id. Usually, the OIA will only send the request after it has been 
translated. Id. 
94. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 342. The first MLAT was negotiated with the Swiss. See 
infra notes 182-212 and accompanying text. 
95. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9-90.050 (2004). Any local, state or federal 
prosecutor who needs overseas evidence can make an MLAT request. To make the request, the 
prosecutor contacts an OIA attorney who will work with the prosecutor to draft the request. Snow, 
supra note 78 at 227-28. 
Requests must generally be in writing, though more recent treaties allow requests in another form in 
urgent circumstances. Requests must contain: the name of the authority conducting the investigation; 
a description of the evidence sought and the purpose for which it is sought; applicable legal 
provisions (with their texts), the name and location of the persons sought, and any procedures for 
obtaining or authenticating the foreign evidence that will assist in its admissibility in the U.S. Id. at 
n.70. After the request is translated, the OIA forwards the MLAT request directly to the other 
country's Central Authority. Many countries have statutes which provide procedures for responding 
to foreign MLAT requests. Similar to the process followed in the United States, foreign prosecutors 
will obtain subpoenas or other compulsory orders from their courts. Once the requested evidence is 
obtained, it is returned by the Central Authority of the requested country to the OIA. The OIA then 
forwards the evidence directly to the prosecutor. Id. The evidence gathered generally cannot be used 
for purposes other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested State. 
Some treaties permit the use of information for any purpose once it becomes public. Id. 
96. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Pisani) ("[Rlequests made via 
MLATs can often be turned around and received in a matter of weeks, and, in some cases, even 
shorter."). 
97. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 319. 
98. Id. 
99. See infia notes 117-124 and accompanying text. 
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confidential,loO preventing suspects from learning of the request and attempting 
to hide, obscure, or destroy evidence. Fifth, they can permit requests to be made 
prior to the institution of criminal proceedings. This allows administrative 
agencies and grand juries to request evidence under the treaty.lo1 Sixth, MLATs 
can require the provision of evidence in cases where no "dual criminality"lo2 
exists. 
Despite their many advantages, MLATs contain one serious flaw. The vast 
majority explicitly exclude criminal defendants from the benefits of the 
compulsory process provisions. Prosecutors are guaranteed access to foreign 
evidence while defendants are not. 
As of October 1, 2005, the United States has signed 61 MLATs and the 
number continues to grow.lo3 All but the three earliest contain language 
restricting defense access.lo4 This is significant because MLATs are negotiated 
with those nations that pose a significant .transnational crime problem. As su. 
result, in the majority of cases where defendants require foreign evidence to 
100. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 319. The United States wanted to limit the amount of 
information necessary to support an MLAT request to prevent targets from learning of the 
investigation and trying to undermine United States' evidence gathering efforts by either legal 
recourse or illicit intimidation and bribery. Id. at 361. These efforts were not always successful. The 
Swiss treaty, for example, requires that "[u]pon receipt of a request for assistance, the requested 
State shall notify . . . any person from whom a statement or testimony or documents, records, or 
articles of evidence are sought;" See Swiss MLAT, supra note 93, at art. 36(a). This provision warns 
suspects that they are under investigation at an earlier stage of the investigation than is required 
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, giving them greater opportunities to shift their funds 
and otherwise hide evidence. Another problematic provision from the point of view of the United 
States requires that requests for assistance include not only "the subject matter and nature of the 
investigation or proceeding" but also "a description of the essential acts alleged or sought to be 
ascertained"; see id. Art. 29(l)(a). As a consequence of this provision, suspects learn the 
prosecution's theory at an early stage in the investigation. In the United States, the defendant often 
does not discover that theory until the indictment. The United States was successful in maintaining 
secrecy in the Italian MLAT. That treaty contains a provision allowing the United States to request 
that the application for assistance and the contents of the request remain confidential. See Treaty 
Between the United States and Italy on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Together with 
a Related Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-Italy, art. 8(2), Nov. 9, 1982, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
Treaty Doc. 98-25, [hereinafter Italian MLAT]. 
10 1. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 332. 
102. Id. at 333. Dual criminality refers to behavior that is criminal in both jurisdictions. Id. at 6- 
7. 
103. As of September 28,2009, these countries include: Anguilla, AntigualBarbuda, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Belguim, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Canada, 
Cayman Islands, Columbia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, European Union, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montserrat, 
Morocco, Netherlands, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, St. Kitts-Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. U.S. DEP'T 
OF STATE, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
(MLAT) AND OTHER AGREEMENTS, http://~vel.state.g0v/law/info/judicia~judicial~69O.html. 
104. The three earliest MLATs are the Swiss, Turkish and Netherlands treaties. 
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defend themselves, they are forced to rely upon inefficient market processeslo5 
while the government obtains evidence pursuant to the treaty. This creates a 
significant compulsion disparity in transnational criminal cases. 
v. 
COMPARING THE INSTITUTIONS 
The four institutions that can play a role in protecting the norm of 
compulsion parity are the evidence-gathering market, the political process, the 
executive, and the courts. Each has its own merits and shortcomings. Only by 
comparing institutional capabilities is it possible to make an informed choice 
amongst them. Since the relevant decision-makers are the same, many of the 
factors considered are transferable to other criminal process questions. The 
Subparts below examine each institution's competence to safeguard parity either 
singly or in conjunction with another institution. 
A. The Market for Foreign Evidence 
Without MLATs, parties struggle to obtain foreign evidence because it is 
beyond the reach of domestic subpoenas. Law enforcement and defendants 
utilize either informal methods, such as cooperation and unilateral actions, or a 
formal diplomatic process called letters rogatory to obtain foreign evidence. 
Though far from perfect, these processes make up an informal community or 
market that represents a viable institutional choice for attaining the goal of equal 
access to evidence between prosecutors and defendants. What follows is an 
examination of this market. Comparative institutional analysis necessitates this 
exploration because one option for eliminating the compulsion disparity that 
currently exists between the prosecution and the defense is a return to the pre- 
MLAT world. 
1. Informal Evidence Gathering 
American law enforcement agents abroad often develop informal, 
cooperative relationships with their foreign counterparts. By working closely 
with their foreign equivalents, they can conduct investigations and obtain 
evidence while avoiding accusations that they are performing investigative 
operations normally reserved for employees of a sovereign. Cooperation often 
takes place below the radar of high level government officials so as not to be 
hindered by government policies.106 High level officials pay attention only 
105. See infra notes 108-142 and accompanying text. 
106. This is a notion advanced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. called 
"transgovernmental relations." See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., Transgovernmental 
Relations and International Organizations, WORLD POLITICS 27, 43 (1974) (referring to "sets of 
direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided 
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when the activities of agents or prosecutors "assume political significance, 
attract media attention or threaten to disrupt other dimensions of a state's foreign 
relations."lo7 
Despite significant obstacles, cooperation and internationalization of 
policing has made great strides. American law enforcement agencies have 
increased their presence in foreign nations. For example, legal attaches operate 
as overseas agents of the ~ ~ 1 . l ~ ~  They handle all international matters that fall 
within the FBI's jurisdictionlog and their presence facilitates informal 
cooperation. Legal attaches do not typically investigate criminal matters. Rather, 
they work as liaisons between American and foreign law enforcement agencies 
and prosecutors,110 playing a crucial role in cutting through red tape and 
expediting requests to and from the United States for information and 
evidence.l l1 Other law enforcement agencies such as the DEA~ l2 and the Secret 
Service also have an international presence that facilitates cooperation.113 
Additionally, the United States' office of Interpol assists with communications 
between the United States and foreign police agencies.'14 
Cooperative arrangements are not always possible, however, because they 
depend upon dual criminality1 l5 and similar law enforcement priorities. Absent 
informal cooperation, American law enforcement officials sometimes resort to 
three forms of unilateral action. First, law enforcement officials attempt to 
operate as private investigators rather than as representatives of a foreign 
sovereign.l16 This option is often problematic. Regardless of whether agents 
exercise their sovereign powers to arrest and the like, they are still employees of 
a foreign nation. Most nations do not take kindly to unilateral operations by 
foreign law enforcement and many have laws prohibiting such activity.l l7 Also, 
local law enforcement agents may resent foreign agents operating on their 
turf.ll They may report the activity to high level government officials, creating 
by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments") cited in NADELMANN, 
supra note 10, at 107-9. 
107. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 108. 
108. Id. at 150. 
109. Id. at 152. 
110. Id.at152-3. 
11 1. Id, at 153. 
112. Id. at 147-150. 
113. Id. at 164-167. 
114. Id.atl81. 
115. For example, joint investigations of securities law violations are hampered by the fact that 
many of these violations simply are not criminal acts in other countries. Id. at 6-7. 
1 16. Id. at 8. 
117. For example, in many nations, laws forbid foreign agents from carrying firearms and even 
preclude them fiom conducting interviews and carrying out other investigative inquiries on their 
own. Id. at 190. 
1 18. See id. at 108-9. 
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friction between the nations.'19 Second, unilateral action also takes the form of 
pressuring foreign nations to accommodate U.S. law enforcement needs.120 
Finally, in rare cases, unilateral actions involve bribery of foreign officials121 
and a b d ~ c t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  As can be imagined, these unilateral measures lead to 
international friction. 123 
The same obstacles that hinder transnational criminal investigations can 
sometimes provide benefits  to criminals. Successfully investigating and 
obtaining transnational evidence for prosecution is difficult. Transnational 
lawbreakers often take advantage of the lack of cooperation between nations and 
investigatory hindrances.124 For example, offenders can hide the proceeds of 
their criminal activity in foreign bank accounts, safe in the knowledge that 
blocking statutes, designed specifically to limit the availability of financial 
documents and records, will hamper prosecutors' efforts to obtain important 
evidence.125 The hurdles prosecutors face in obtaining foreign evidence often 
lead them to forgo prosecution.126 For the transnational offender, "foreign 
territories and alien systems offer safe havens, lucrative smuggling 
opportunities, and legal shields and thickets to disguise their criminal 
119. This occurred in a case in which the author was involved. Police off~cers from Washington 
State located and interviewed witnesses living in Canada without the prior permission or cooperation 
of local Canadian police. The local police learned of the unilateral police activity and reported it to 
high level government officials, resulting in friction between Canada and the United States. 
120. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 7. One form of pressure the United States was able to exert 
resulted from the growth of multinational corporations doing business in the United States. Foreign 
corporations operating in the United States were susceptible to court orders and subpoenas served 
upon their branches and personnel. Id. at 316. One well-known case, United States. v. Bank of Nova 
Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), arose from such a situation. See injk note 140. When fines 
are levied against domestic branches for failing to comply with subpoenas for records existing in the 
foreign branches of these corporations, foreign nations often respond to this unilateral financial 
pressure by agreeing to cooperate and providing the requested records. NADELMANN, supra note 10, 
at 358-9. Another form of unilateral action taken by the United States was the use of Ghidoni 
waivers. See generally Harvey M .  Silets and Susan W. Brenner, Compelled Consent: An Ox.vmoron 
with Sinister Consequences for Citizens Who Patronize Foreign Banking Institutions, 20 CASE W .  
RES. J. INT'L L. 435 (1988).These waivers allow a court to order a grand jury target to sign a consent 
form waiving any bank secrecy privilege. Id. at 435-436. 
121. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 323. 
122. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
123. For example, international tensions arose between the United States and the United 
Kingdom when prosecutors began serving subpoenas upon local branches of multinational 
corporations, commonly referred to as "Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas" (referencing well-known 
cases involving such subpoenas). Civil fines are imposed for failures to comply. See infra note 140. 
To resolve the tension, the Justice Department ordered that all subpoenas to institutions in the United 
States for records located abroad be cleared through the Department. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 
359-360. This became known as "the Jensen memorandum" after Associate Attorney General D. 
Lowell Jensen. Id. at 360. 
124. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 324. 
125. Id. at 314,324. 
126. Id. at 322-23. 
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enterprises."127 
However, when criminal defendants require foreign evidence to defend 
themselves, they often face challenges more acute than those of law enforcement 
and prosecutors. Defendants cannot informally ally with law enforcement 
communities in other nations to aid in investigations. They cannot take 
advantage of the diplomatic pressures that governments exert to facilitate 
cooperation.128 And, while they can obtain personal records and evidence such 
as their own financial documents or telephone records by requesting them 
directly from foreign institutions,129 they cannot obtain other types of evidence 
through informal mechanisms except perhaps through bribery or other corrupt 
means. 
Both the government and defendants can hire private investigators.130 
These investigators can operate abroad without raising sovereignty concerns. 
Law enforcement reliance on private investigators has decreased, though, as 
cooperation and harmonization among governments has increased.131 However, 
defendants still rely upon them, as long as they have sufficient funds to hire 
them. 
2. Formal Evidence Gathering: Letters Rogatory 
The primary formal method available to prosecutors and defendants for 
obtaining foreign evidence in the absence of an MLAT is a process called letters 
rogatory.132 The letters rogatory procedure requires the party seeking foreign 
evidence or other assistance to submit a formal request through diplomatic 
127. Id. at 6. The United State was concerned with the protection organized crime received 
from financial secrecy jurisdictions like Switzerland. Id. at 324. Despite serious efforts, law 
enforcement and prosecutors were unable to obtain financial evidence from these jurisdictions. Id. 
128. Id. at 109. 
129. For example, under the laws of the Cayman Islands, disclosure of bank records is generally 
prohibited unless the customer consents or the Cayman Grand Court orders disclosure. See 
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (1995 Revision), available at 
<http:l/broadhurstbarristers.com!htm~aws.html~. 
130. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 17, 99-100. One of the largest private detective agencies 
was the Pinkerton Detective Agency, whose principal client between 1890 and 1892 was the federal 
government. Id. at 49, 55-58. When the agency was investigated in 1892 for its role in suppressing 
the Homestead strike, Congress passed a law forbidding the use of private detectives to enforce 
federal law. Id. at 49, (citing HOMER CUMMINGS and CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: 
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 373 (Macmillan 1937)). This 
did not stop the federal government from hiring private detectives. Pinkerton agents were hired by 
the State Department to hunt down Robert LeRoy Parker and Henry Longbaugh, aka Butch Cassidy 
and the Sundance Kid, in the jungles of Bolivia. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 60. Most historians 
agree that the agency was responsible for their deaths. Id. at 60 and note 141. 
131. Id. at 22,101-02. 
132. 28 U.S.C. 5 1781 (1970) (giving courts the discretionary authority to grant and receive 
judicial assistance to and from a foreign court through letters rogatory). 
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channels from a domestic cour t  to a foreign court.133 Letters rogatory are 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, formal judicial proceedings are a 
prerequisite to the use of letters rogatory.134 Hence, the procedure provides little 
assistance to prosecutors seeking evidence prior to instituting proceedings. 
Second, the procedure creates no obligation among nations to provide the 
requested evidence.135 If a country responds to a request, it is simply as a matter 
of comity.136 Even if a response is forthcoming, it frequently takes years.137 
Third, the procedure can be used to request a foreign court to compel the 
133. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 318; Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, 14 
I.L.M. 339 (1975) (entered into force Aug. 27, 1988), at art. 5, cited in Abraham Abramovsky & 
Jonathan I. Edelstein, Time for Final Action on 18 U.S.C. see. 3292, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941, 947 
(2000) (providing that letters rogatory must be certified by a diplomatic or consular agency); David 
Whedbee, The Faint Shadow ojthe Sixth Amendment: Substantial Imbalance in Evidence-Gathering 
Capacity Abroad Under the U.S.-P.R.C. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in Criminal Matters, 
12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 561,570 (2003). 
134. At least one court has allowed the issuance of a letter rogatory in support of grand jury 
proceedings. United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971). However, many common law 
countries will refuse to respond to a request made before formal charges have been filed. See 
ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 9, 512-4-3, at 132 note 1. See also NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 
322 (many countries reject letters rogatory requests coming from grand juries.) 
135. See &BELL & RISTAu, supra note 9, $12-3-3, at 87-88. Upon reviewing a request, the 
foreign court, at its discretion, may choose then to issue orders to the appropriate authority in its 
country asking it to produce the requested evidence. Id. at 88. See also Whedbee, supra note 135, at 
570. Foreign courts are often reluctant to obtain evidence for criminal proceedings in another 
country and many lack officials specifically charged with responding to requests. NADELMANN, 
supra note 10, at 322. 
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 5 101 cmt. e (1978). The 
meaning of the comity doctrine remains unclear. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1, 3 (1991) (noting comity has been variously defined as "a rule of choice of 
law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns, a moral necessity, 
expediency, reciprocity or 'considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining 
amicable and workable relationship between nations."'). In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 
(1895), the Supreme Court noted comity "in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other;" Instead, it is "the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience." 
137. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Pisani) ("[Elven with countries 
where we have the best of relations, it takes an average of 6 months now to have a return on a letters 
rogatory. That is far too long in the Twentieth Century to wait."). In a lecture given in 2000 in Japan, 
the Director of the OIA stated, "Too often, however, the letter process is not very successful, and the 
prosecutor or police officer who generates a letter rogatory may wait many frustrating months, or 
years, only to find that the requested evidence is not produced. We have many cases in which 
evidence sought by letters rogatory is supplied long after the trial for which it was requested has 
been completed." Harris Lecture, supra note 91. See also Abramovsky & Edelstein, Time for Final 
Action on 18 U.S.C. 5 3292, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941, 949 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-907,2d Sess. 
(1984)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3578; Worldwide Review of Status qf U.S. 
Extradition Treaties and MufuaZ Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearings Before the House C o r n .  On 
Foreign Aflairs, 100th Cong. 36-37 (1987) (discussing the use of letters rogatory and their 
limitations as compared to MLATs). If a defendant is in custody, the long wait for evidence that may 
never arrive pursuant to a letter rogatory may raise Sixth Amendment speedy trial concerns, 
especially in cases where the prosecution has an existing MLAT with the country from which the 
evidence is sought. 
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testimony of foreign witnesses, to obtain permission to interview witnesses, and 
to obtain documents.138 However, evidence gathered may not be in a form 
admissible in American courts. Due to the inadequacies of the process, letters 
rogatory are often replaced by informal evidence gathering.139 When countries 
fail to provide evidence under letters rogatory, the United States frequently 
resorts to unilateral actions both to obtain the evidence and to pressure the other 
nation into negotiating MLATS.'~' 
Although informal law enforcement cooperation and the letters rogatory 
process are not ideal methods for obtaining evidence,141 neither party is 
guaranteed access to foreign evidence. In other words, evidence gathering parity 
exists in the market. While this solution is by no means ideal, comparative 
institutional analysis teaches that no institutional choice is perfect. If the goal of 
achieving compulsion parity is important to the fair functioning of our criminal 
justice system, as this Article argues, difficult institutional choices and 
compromises must be made. A return to the pre-MLAT market represents a 
viable means of achieving compulsion parity, and must be considered alongside 
the political process, the executive, and the courts. 
B. The Political Process 
Another institution that can play a role in protecting the norm of 
compulsion parity is the political process, namely, the Senate. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee takes testimony from interested parties regarding 
treaties and issues reports to the full Senate with recommendations regarding 
ratification. The Senate can remedy compulsion disparity by declining to ratify 
138. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 319. 
139. Id. at 318. Some nations will respond to informal requests such as those made through 
Interpol to obtain evidence. Others require the more formal letters rogatory. Id. at 318-9. For 
example, in an effort to obtain fmancial records from banks in the Cayman Islands, a country with 
strong bank secrecy laws, prosecutors convinced the federal courts to issue letters rogatory to 
C a y m  courts. However, the Cayman courts refused to respond with the requested evidence. 
Prosecutors then resorted to unilateral measures, serving subpoenas duces tecum to the Miami 
branch of the Canadian Bank of Nova Scotia seeking records maintained in the banks' Bahamian, 
Cayman Islands, and Antigua branches. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 
(1 lth Cir. 1982) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 
817 (11th Cir. 1984). When the bank refused to comply on the basis that compliance would violate 
its country's bank secrecy laws, the federal court agreed to levy daily fines of $25,000 on the bank. 
This was the first time the courts became involved in the process of helping the government obtain 
foreign evidence by ordering sanctions. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 358. Even with the existence 
of letters rogatoM the United States still resorted to unilateral actions such as bribing local officials. 
Id. at 357. 
140. Id. "[Tlhe principle incentive for many foreign governments to negotiate MLATs with the 
United States was, and remains, the desire to curtail the resort by U.S. prosecutors, police agents, 
and courts to unilateral, extraterritorial means of collecting evidence from abroad." Id. at 3 15. 
141. The informal and formal processes that exist suffer from uncertainty as a result of systemic 
obstacles such as foreign legal institutions, political tensions and the lack of compulsory mechanisms 
for ensuring the provision of foreign evidence. MLATs are negotiated to overcome these problems. 
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MLATs that create it. 
The major advantage of the political process is its responsiveness to public 
will and its ability to gather facts through hearings.142 The competence of the 
Senate to protect parity depends upon the opportunity and ability of various 
interests to effectively have their voices and views considered by Senators. Two 
forms of political malfbnction, minoritarian bias and majoritarian bias, can 
distort the political process. Determining what form of bias is likely to exist is 
crucial because that bias will affect the competence of the Senate to protect the 
norm of compulsion parity. Below, the Senate's MLAT ratification history is 
examined, and the majoritarian bias which prevented parity interests from being 
seriously considered by Senators is exposed. 
I .  RatiJication History 
Prior to 1988, Senate ratification of MLATs occurred perfunctorily, with 
little fanfare or opposition.143 However, that changed in 1988 when the 
executive presented the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with additional 
MLATs to consider and ratify.144 For the first time, these MLATs contained 
provisions preventing defendants from utilizing the compulsory process 
provisions.145 As a result, executive officials faced serious opposition to 
ratification. The opposition groups included the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar 
~ s s o c i a t i o n , ~ ~ ~  the American Civil Liberties Union and private criminal defense 
142. IMPERFECT AL ERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 68. 
143. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 379. 
144. Id.; Bruce Zagaris and Jessica Resnick, The Mexico-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Treaty: Another Step Toward the Harmonization of International Law 
Enforcement, 14 ARE. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 20 (1997). The Senate was considering the treaties 
with the Cayman Islands, Mexico, Canada, Belgium, Thailand and the Bahamas. Cayman Islands, 
supra note 1, at 5. 
145. The MLATs with the Cayman Islands, Mexico, Canada, and Belgium provide they do "not 
give rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain . . . any evidence!' The Bahamian and 
Thailand treaties provide that the treaties are intended "solely" for mutual assistance between the 
government and law enforcement authorities of the contracting parties and are "not intended or 
designed to provide such assistance to private parties!' See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, U.S.-Bahamas, art. 1(3), S. TREATY DOC. 100-17 (1987). 
A few years later, in 1996, the executive faced similar opposition to the Austrian MLAT. In my 
discussions of the legislative history concerning the opposition to this language, no distinction is 
made between testimony offered during the hearings in 1988-89 and that in 1996. Although there 
also was opposition to several other provisions of the treaties, the focus is on the opposition to the 
treaties' language baning defense access to the compulsory process provisions. For an extended 
discussion of the complicated legislative history surrounding these treaties and the objections to 
other provisions of the treaty, see generally Zagaris and Resnick, supra note 146. 
146. The American Bar Association testified in support of defense access and the Criminal 
Justice Section of the ABA issued a resolution, approved unanimously by the ABA's House of 
Delegates, that "every future MLAT should expressly permit criminal defendants to use the treaty to 
obtain evidence from the Requested country to use in their defense if they can make a showing of 
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lawyers (collectively, the "defense lobby").147 The defense lobby argued the 
treaties should not be ratif ied because they created an unconstitutional 
compulsion disparity.148 Executive officials dismissed this criticism149 and their 
arguments were persuasive. The Committee vote was nearly unanimous in favor 
of recommending ratification of these MLATS.~~' Only one Senator, the late 
Jesse Helms, criticized MLATs, in part because of the inequity in evidence 
gathering capabilities they created.151 He questioned why criminal defendants' 
only option for obtaining foreign evidence would be the inefficient and 
discretionary letters rogatory152 process when "MLATs [were] the result of the 
United States deciding that the letters rogatory were not satisfactory for U.S. 
prosecutorial needs because they were too slow in obtaining information.7y153 
necessity to the trial court." ABA Criminal Justice Section Report No. 109 (1989) cited in Michael 
Abbell, DOJRenavs Assault on Defendant $ Right to Use Treaties to Obtain Evidence from Abroad, 
THE CHAMPION, AUG. 21,1997, at 20,21. 
147. Abbell, supra note 148, at 21. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 380. 
148. The primary opposition came from testimony by Michael Abbell, the first director of OIA 
who is now a defense lawyer. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 380. He argued the exclusionsuy 
language violated fairness norms and the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment. He 
pointed out that defendants would be forced to rely upon the inadequate letters rogatory process 
while the prosecution could take advantage of MLATs. 
149. Justice Department officials were not happy with their former colleague's criticisms. Id. at 
380-81. 
150. The vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was 17-2 in favor of the MLATs. 
NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 383. Senator Helms represented one of the nay votes. The treaties 
were not ratified by the full Senate until late 1989. Id. at 383. By that time, Senator Helms had 
successfully appended two reservations to the treaty, one of which stated that nothing in the MLAT 
would require or authorize "legislation or other action by the United States prohibited by the U.S. 
Constitution as interpreted by the United States." Id. at 381-83. Neither reservation directly 
addressed the compulsion disparity concern. 
151. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 6, 52-55. Helms raised concerns about the disparity. 
Id. at 175; Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 
91 AM.J. INT'L. L. 93, 100 (Januwy, 1997) (setting forth the written questions submitted by Senator 
Helms to the Department of State in connection with hearings over the advice and consent of a 
number of MLATs in 1996). His written questions included the following: 
Defendants do not have access to information through MLAT procedures. This 
disparity between prosecution and defendant in access to MLAT procedures has led 
some to question the fairness and even the constitutionality of MLATs denying 
individual rights. At the core of the legal objections is the belief that it is improper in 
our adversarial system of justice to deny defendants compulsory process and other 
effective procedures from compelling evidence abroad if those procedures are 
available to the prosecution . . . . Are there any efforts to provide access to information 
under consideration in current negotiations? 
152. Letters rogatory are a completely discretionary and diplomatic process for obtaining 
foreign evidence. See supra notes 134-143 and accompanying text for a description of the failings of 
the letters rogatory procedure. 
153. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 175. In relevant part, Senator Helms' question was as 
follows: 
I believe that the Justice Department says that individuals can use letters rogatory, . . . 
but the MLATs are the result of the United States deciding that the letters rogatory 
were not satisfactory for U.S. prosecutorial needs because they were too slow in 
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The Committee's report to the Senate recommending ratification did 
acknowledge that the "disparity between prosecution and defendant . . . has led 
some to question the fairness and event [sic] the constitutionality of MLATs 
denying individual rights."154 However, the report concluded, "it is clear that 
MLATs are intended to aid law enforcement authorities only."155 The 
Committee's decision to ratifjr the MLATs, despite its awareness of the 
compulsion disparity they created, is evidence of political malfunction in the 
form of majoritarian bias. A discussion of political malfunction and how it 
affected the Senate ratification process follows. 
2. Evidence of Majoritarian Bias 
Political malfunction can take the form of minoritarian or majoritarian bias, 
depending upon how the impacts of a policy are distributed amongst those 
affected.156 Minoritarian bias occurs when a special interest minority group 
prevails on an issue that disproportionately harms the majority. The majority 
could change the policy by virtue of its numbers, but each individual member of 
the majority is only minimally affected, for example, the per capita impact of the 
policy is small. There is little incentive for individuals to expend time and 
energy to understand the issues or even to recognize the harm to their 
interests.157 On the other hand, the per capita impact on individual members of 
the special interest minority group is large. Each member thus has the incentive 
to understand its interests, organize political activity and determine the most 
effective way to influence the political process in order to prevail.158 Hence, 
minoritarian bias is most likely to occur when an interest group with small 
numbers and high per capita stakes is pitted against a majority with low per 
capita stakes.159 
Majoritarian bias also results from a skewed distribution of impacts.160 But 
this time, the majority understands its interests and votes to implement a policy 
that harms the minority group far more than any corresponding benefit to the 
majority. Although the minority group may understand the disproportionate 
harm to its interests, it simply cannot overcome the power of the majority to 
obtaining information . . . . My question is, Why should American citizens accused of 
a crime by foreign governments be stuck with a process that the Justice Department 
itself has called "cumbersome and ineffective?" 
154. Austria, supra note 87, at 10. In an earlier MLAT, the committee additionally stated that, 
"[Nlothing in the treaty is intended to negate the authority of the Court to ask the prosecution to 
make requests for information under the treaty." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 5. 
155. Austria, supra note 87, at 9, 10 ("MLATs were intended to be law enforcement tools, and 
were never intended to provide benefits to the defense bar."). 
156. IWERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 68. 
157. Id. at 68-69. 
158. Id. at 68-72. 
159. Id. at 71-72. 
160. A Job for Judges, supra note 40, at 672. 
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outvote them. I6l 
The Committee's overwhelming vote in support of ratification, despite 
awareness of the compulsion disparity, evidences the majoritarian bias that 
existed during the ratification process. Both the executive and defense lobbies 
were well-informed as to the issues surrounding M L A T S I ~ ~  and the channels of 
political influence, and both had high per capita stakes. However, the executive 
lobby successfully influenced the Senate hearings because they could credibly 
threaten to harness the power of the voting majority. In such a situation, when a 
smaller group within the majority has high stakes in an issue and can impel other 
majority members to act, they are known as a catalytic subgroup.163 
A catalytic subgroup operates much like a special interest minority but is 
distinguished by its ability to spur the majority into action.lM In order to do this, 
the subgroup must accomplish three things. First, it must educate the majority to 
care enough about a policy to take steps to implement it. Second, since the 
policy will disproportionately impact a minority group, the subgroup must 
convince majority members that they will not be mistaken for or become a part 
of that minority. Third, the subgroup must attain these goals in a manner that is 
easy for the majority to understand and digest with minimal effort. Otherwise, 
because of the low per capita stakes of each majority group member, they will 
simply not expend energy to learn enough about a particular policy to care 
enough to vote.165 
The subgroup can attain these goals through the use of simple symbols and 
safe targets. Stereotypes are examples of simple symbols. These symbols convey 
considerable information with minimal effort. They are familiar and traditional 
sources of differentiation which people are usually "exposed to at an early 
age."166 As such, they are endowed with meaning that is immediately 
recognized, often creating a visceral, emotional response.167 A swastika is a 
particularly cogent example of a simple symbol that can be used with ease to 
communicate a powerful message to a targeted constituency. 
A safe target is a discrete and easily identifiable group, such as one defined 
by its race or e t h n i ~ i t y , ~ ~ ~  that will be disproportionately harmed by a policy. 
161. Id. 
162. A technical analysis of the treaties is provided to the Senate by the treaty negotiators to 
address anticipated problems and questions. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 354. The executive was 
criticized for failing to make the treaties and their accompanying technical analyses available to the 
public until the eve of the Senate hearings. Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 205, 206 (1988) 
(statement of Bruce Zagaris). 
163. IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 72. 
164. Id. Unlike a special interest group, however, the subgroup has the incentive to inform and 
organize the lower per capita stake members of the majority. Id. 
165. See supra notes 158-161 discussing minoritarian bias. 
166. A Job for Judges, supra note 40, at 676. 
167. Id. at 676-77. 
168. Id. at 677. 
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The target is "safe" only if the majority feels secure that it will not become part 
of or be mistaken for that minority. The more familiar the classification or 
source of difference between the safe target and the members of the majority, 
the easier it is to activate the majority to vote.169 
By coupling a simple symbol with a safe target, the catalytic subgroup can 
efficiently and effectively educate the majority about an issue. Use of these 
symbols and targets lowers the information costs of educating the low stakes 
majority and spurring them to action.170 When a catalytic subgroup can utilize 
simple symbols in conjunction with a safe target, instances of severe 
majoritarian bias are most likely to exist. 
Any advantage the political process has by virtue of its ability to respond to 
the public will and gather facts, becomes a liability in the face of majoritarian 
political malfunction. Catalytic subgroups can influence the political process 
merely by threatening to activate the majority and turn out the vote. By using 
simple symbols against a safe target, the subgroup can issue a subtle threat to 
legislators: side with us or we will activate the majority and vote you out of 
office. If credible, such threats are a powerful bargaining chip when negotiating 
with political actors,171 and can influence policy-making. Thus, legislators' 
responsiveness to the public will may exacerbate majoritarian bias. 
The executive lobby's use of simple symbols against a safe target can 
explain its success before the Senate. Criminal defendants are a safe target 
because they are a discrete, easily identifiable and marginalized group. During 
the Senate hearings, the executive lobby emphasized the message that support 
for MLATs meant politicians were being "tough on crime.77172 This theme was 
echoed numerous times in the testimony of executive branch 0fficia1s.l~~ 
169. Id. at 676. 
170. Id.; IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 73. 
172. The testimony of Mary Mochary, Principle Deputy Legal Adviser with the Department of 
State provides a good example of the executive's use of simple symbols against safe targets: 
We have stressed that mutual legal assistance treaties can help countries fight back 
against the enemies within: Narcotraffickers who threaten the stability of well- 
meaning governments; terrorists who hold the rule of law in contempt; and white- 
collar criminals who enrich themselves by stealing from honest citizens. We have also 
emphasized that the treaties are important because many criminals operate on an 
international scale, orchestrating illegal activities in the United States from foreign 
countries . . . . Today's major criminal. . . whether he embezzles money or launders it, 
is far more likely than not to cross an international border or to leave traces of his 
criminal conduct in several countries. This kind of conduct is not limited to the drug 
trafficker or terrorist, even though they may be most proficient in these practices. This 
is the methodology of the major criminal who seeks to exploit to his advantage the 
barriers to cooperation that can be erected by international borders. 
See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 58-59,225-26. 
173. Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 87,90,92 (testimony of Mary Mochary) ("There is little 
doubt that The Bahamas will remain a significant transshipment point for narcotics for the 
foreseeable future. This fact only underscores the need for more eff~cient and effective cooperation 
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Politicians understand that being "tough on crime" decreases the potential for 
ouster. l 74 
The defense lobby, on the other hand, was at a disadvantage. They could 
not credibly threaten activation of the majority. While they could bring 
politicians' attention to the risk of convicting the innocent in the absence of 
compulsion parity, legislators are aware that most citizens believe that those 
accused of crime have too many rights. In this context, constitutional protections 
for criminal defendants are viewed as "technicalities" that allow the factually 
guilty to go free.175 
Majoritarian bias infected the political process. While it is impossible to 
assert that this bias was the singular causal factor resulting in the ratification of 
MLATs that disproportionately harm those accused of crime, it certainly was a 
significant contributing factor. Unearthing the majoritarian bias that permeated 
the Senate has implications for institutional choice. Majoritarian bias thrives in a 
majoritarian system, making it difficult for the political process to correct the 
policy results it produces as a consequence of the ma1fun~tion.l~~ Whether the 
Senate is competent to protect compulsion parity depends upon the defense 
lobby's ability to counteract the powerful influence of the executive lobby's 
credible threat to activate the majority against Senators who do not vote to give 
in joint law enforcement endeavors;" "[Tlhe treaty with the Cayman Islands will facilitate U.S. 
efforts to obtain bank records and other evidence of money laundering and trafficking in illicit 
narcotics;" "[Tlhe treaty should help shore up U.S. efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics from 
Southeast Asia to the rest of the world."); Id. at 94 (statement of Mark M. Richard presenting the 
views of the Department of Justice) ("The negotiation and implementation of effective mutual legal 
assistance treaties and executive agreements is a very important aspect of our effort to investigate 
and prosecute serious crime. As this Committee knows all too well, we have in recent years seen the 
internationalization of serious crimes such as narcotics trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and 
large scale fraud. As a result, it has become increasingly common that significant evidence in major 
criminal cases will be found abroad. Obtaining such evidence, particularly in a form that will be 
admissible in our courts, has not been an easy matter. The purpose of our MLATs is to provide a 
reliable and efficient means of obtaining this evidence."); Id. at 217 (letter to committee from J. 
Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs) ("Secretary of State Shultz asked me to 
convey to you the importance which he attaches to Senate approval of all six treaties during the 
current session. The treaties are very important to U.S. law enforcement interests, especially in 
obtaining convictions against international narcotics traffickers, terrorists, and other international 
criminals"). 
174. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 509 ("Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher 
sentences ... and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly powerful the past two 
decades, as both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate 
the label 'tough on crime."'). 
175. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment: Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm ofAppIying 
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 170-1 7 1 (1 99 1) (referencing the 
public's view that too many guilty defendants go free based upon "technicalities."); Guido Calabresi, 
Lms and Truth: Debate: Exclusionary Rules: The Exclusionay Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
1 1 1, 11 1 (2003) (conservatives view the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule as a "technicality" 
that frees guilty criminal defendants). 
176. A Jobfor Judges, supra note 40, at 705. 
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advice and consent to MLATs. This may prove difficult when politicians believe 
that being "soft on crime" will hurt their chances of re-e1ecti0n.l~~. 
C. The Executive 
The executive branch also plays a role in protecting compulsion parity 
because it is responsible for negotiating MLATs. This institution occupies a 
unique position in our adversarial criminal justice system. On the one hand, it 
must be concerned with effectively prosecuting the guilty. On the other, its 
agents, the prosecutors, must'act as "ministers of justice"178 to ensure that 
defendants receive a fair t1-ia1.l~~ Bias can exist in this institution when the 
177. Politicians are loath to be characterized as "soft on crime." See, e.g., Jill Young Miller, 
Hanging Tough; She's Survived Polio, Poverty and Two Bouts of Bone Cancer. Georgia Supreme 
Court Justice Carol Hunstein Is Used to Fighting. She Says She'll Never Be the Same after a 
Bruising Battle for Re-election, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Dec. 17, 2006, at ID; Jennifer 
Steinhauer, Bulging, Troubled Prisons Push Calijoinia Oflcials to Seek a New Approach, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11,2006, at A18. A change in attitude may occur if the defense lobby can demonstrate 
that a factually innocent person was wrongfully convicted as a result of the absence of compulsion 
parity. See generally JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION & OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1st ed. 2000) for a discussion of how wrongful 
convictions can affect legislative reform and public opinion. 
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); See also ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.3, cmt. (3d ed. 
1993) (the prosecutor must "strive not for 'courtroom victories'. ..but for results that best serve the 
overall interests of justice."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (The 
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek 
justice, not merely to convict."); Lisa Kurcias, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, I209 (2000) ("The prosecutor has this duty to seek justice because she 
is a representative, not of a single individual, but of the government and society as a whole."); 
Richard Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 693,695 (1987) ("The prosecutor's role as an advocate is tempered by an obligation of 
fairness, a duty to ensure that each trial results in an accurate determination of guilt and 
punishment."); Jennifer Blair, The Regulation of Federal Prosecutorial Misconduct by State Bar 
Associations: 28 U.S.C. 530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 625, 629 (2001) 
("federal prosecutors have shouldered the heightened obligation to always 'seek justice,' and not to 
merely be an advocate for a client."). 
179. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (The prosecutor, as 
the agent of the people and the State, has the unique duty to ensure fundamentally fair trials by 
seeking not only to convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer justice.). See also Moore 
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 809-810 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It 
is the State that tries a man, and it is the State that must insure that the trial is fair."). As stated by the 
Supreme Court over 70 years ago: 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of 
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
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appropriate balance between these conflicting roles is upset. The existence of 
bias affects the executive's competence to protect the norm of equal access to 
foreign evidence. Scrutinizing the role this institution played in negotiating 
MLATs uncovers the extent of any bias that existed. The two subparts below 
analyze the negotiation history of the first MLAT, and the executive's role in 
creating the current compulsion disparity. 
1. Negotiating the Swiss MLAT 
The evolution of MLATs is primarily a chronicle of the executive branch's 
efforts to facilitate foreign evidence-gathering and ensure its provision in a form 
admissible in American courts.180 The United States negotiated its first MLAT 
with switzerland.181 Examination of the negotiation process reveals its delicate 
nature and the seemingly insurmountable hurdles executive officials overcame. 
While each MLAT negotiation involves different considerations dependent upon 
existing political relations with the country and the differing law enforcement 
priorities of each,lS2 valuable lessons were learned during the Swiss 
negotiations that facilitated the negotiation of subsequent treaties.183 
The Swiss MLAT was the first negotiated between a civil law and a 
common law country.184 Officials fiom the State, Justice and Treasury 
Departments as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission were given 
negotiating responsibility.185 The United States sought an MLAT with 
Switzerland primarily because it had the toughest bank secrecy laws.186 These 
laws had stymied the efforts of prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to 
obtain information fiom Swiss financial institutions.187 As a result, organized 
crime, including the Mafia, successfully hid assets in ~witzer1and.l~~ 
wrongll conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See generally Bruce Green, Why Should 
Prosecutors Seek Justice? 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,634 (1999). 
180. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 327. 
181. Id.at323. 
182. Id. at 345-375 (discussing the different incentives for negotiating treaties with other 
countries). 
183. Id. at 345. 
184. Id. at 326. Switzerland was already a signatory to a multilateral MLAT, the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, European Treaty Series No. 30, and several 
bi-lateral criminal assistance treaties with European countries. See Lionel Frei, Overcoming Bank 
Secrecy: Assistance in Tar Matters in Switzerland on Behalf of Foreign Criminal Authorities, 9 
N.Y.L. SCH. J INT'L & COMP. L 107 (1988). 
185. Id. at 324. 
186. Id. at 324-25 (explaining other reasons for negotiating the treaty with Switzerland first.) 
See also, Lionel Frei, Overcoming Bank Secrecy: Assistance in Tar Matters in Switzerland on Behalf 
qfForeign Criminal Authorities, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J INT'L & COMP. L. 107, 112-22 (1988) (discussing 
how foreign nations can obtain information despite Swiss bank secrecy laws). 
187. Id. at 324-25. 
188. Id. at 324-26. 
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Negotiations were politically sensitive and took over nine years to 
complete.18g The Swiss press periodically criticized the negotiations, fanning 
fears that treaty requests would be relatively one-sided, with most coming from 
the United states.lgO Additionally, Swiss business leaders feared potential 
investors would invest elsewhere if MLATs allowed the United States to pierce 
bank secrecy laws.lgl Eventually, the negotiators held meetings with Swiss 
business and banking leaders and obtained their support for the treaty.lg2 The 
treaty was signed in 19731g3 and ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Swiss in 
1976.1g4 
The negotiation of the Swiss treaty illuminates the challenges and 
compromises involved in creating a mechanism for regularizing foreign 
evidence gathering. Even after the treaty was signed, the transition was rocky. 
For example, the United States angered the Swiss by continuing to utilize 
unilateral measures, such as court orders,lg5 to compel Swiss banks located in 
the United States to provide evidence in violation of Swiss bank secrecy 
laws.lg6 The countries negotiated and signed two Memorandums of 
Understanding to resolve the tensions,lg7 and agreed every effort would be 
made to utilize the MLAT before resorting to unilateral measures. By the end of 
the 1980s, most of the kinks were resolved.lg8 
The executive learned valuable lessons from the Swiss negotiations and 
from using the treaty which helped it to anticipate problems and avoid pitfalls in 
future negotiations.lg9 First, the executive learned to negotiate treaties more 
189. Treaty negotiations began in 1967 and ended when the treaty was ratified in 1976. 
NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 326, 334. For fhrther discussion of the negotiating history of the 
U.S. and Swiss MLAT, see Lionel Frei and Stefan Treschel, Origins and Applications of the United 
States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 3 1 HARV. INT'L L.J. 77 (1990). 
190. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 327 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 333. 
194. See Swiss MLAT, supra note 93. 
195. For example, the United States resorted to unilateral measures during discovery in the 
largest tax evasion case in U.S. history. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 338. Prosecutors obtained a 
subpoena duces tecum from a federal court which they served on the U.S. based subsidiary of a 
Swiss company. When the Swiss company failed to comply, the court issued a fine of $50,000 per 
day. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Mark Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d 
Cir.1983); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Marc Rich 
& Co., A.G., 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984); 739 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1984). The case eventually settled. 
196. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 335. 
197. See id. at 336-39. 
198. Id. at 339. A similar agreement was included in the MLAT with the Cayman Islands. Id. at 
361. The U.S. agreed not to serve subpoenas duces tecum on U.S. branches of foreign banks as a 
way of circumventing bank secrecy laws. See Art. 17 of Cayman MLAT, NADELMANN, supra note 
10, at 361,363-65. 
199. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 341,343. In 1979, the State Department created the Office 
of Law Enforcement and Intelligence (LEI). Id. at 342. The LEI and OIA began negotiating MLATs 
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quickly, avoiding the laborious nine year process experienced with the 
Second, it learned that having at least one foreign representative with experience 
in criminal prosecutions could help streamline negotiations?01 That person 
could explain the country's criminal processes and also build relationships with 
executive officials in order to facilitate requests later made under the treaty?02 
Third, the language of the treaties was simplified in order to broaden the types 
of evidence available, reduce the likelihood that courts from either country 
would impede legal assistance, and avoid future disagreements?03 
2. Creation of the Compulsion Disparity 
The Swiss treaty is silent regarding defense access to its compulsory 
process provisions.2w There is no evidence defense access was discussed or 
even considered. This changed in future MLATs, the reason for which is 
unclear. Perhaps the experience of prosecutors litigating a major fraud case 
utilizing the Swiss MLAT accounts for the change. In January of 1980, Italian 
financier Michele Sindona was charged with 69 counts, including fraud and 
perjury, in connection with the collapse of the Franklin National ~ a n k . 2 ~ ~  Prior 
to trial, Sindona requested evidence pursuant to the MLAT with the Swiss. This 
was the first time a defendant sought foreign evidence under the MLAT. The 
prosecution refused to utilize the treaty on Sindona's behalf. However, because 
the treaty was silent regarding a defendant's ability to use it to obtain evidence, 
the federal district court ordered the Department of Justice to request the 
evidence or the case would be dismissed with prejudice. 206 
Prior to the Sindona prosecution, the possibility that defendants could take 
advantage of MLATs may not have occurred to executive officials. Whether or 
not the Sindona prosecution had any bearing on the change, it is certainly 
interesting that after Sindona's trial in early 1980, every subsequent MLAT, 
save one, included language restricting its use to the government.207 There is no 
together. Id. at 342. This partnership worked well, with the LEI bringing expertise in the politics of 
judicial assistance and treaty negotiations and the OIA bringing expertise in prosecuting crime and in 
making and responding to MLAT requests. Id. 
200. See id. at 334,343. 
201. Id.at343. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 346. 
204. See, e.g., 27 U.S.T. 2019, Articles 9, 10,25. 
205. United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980). For background on the prosecution 
of Michele 'The Shark" Sindona, see James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way 
to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CASE W .  RES. J. INT'L L., 405,415 (1988). 
206. See ABBELL Aim RISTAU, supra note 9, 312-4-8, at 174 n.7; Alan Ellis and Robert L. 
Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, in INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 2d edition 403, 440 (M. Cherif 
Bmiouni ed., 1999). 
207. The treaty with the Netherlands is the exception. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in 
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need to speculate about the purpose for adding the restrictive language. A State 
Department official stated, "MLATs were intended to be law enforcement tools, 
and were never intended to provide benefits to the defense bar.''208 The 
executive gives numerous explanations for creating the disparity: it has the job 
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;209 granting access to defendants 
would deter other nations from negotiating M L A T S ; ~ ~ ~  and defendants do not 
need compulsory process because they have greater access to foreign 
evidence.211 The executive has even denied that MLATs create compulsory 
process.212 
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Neth., June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10,734. It does not contain the restrictive 
language although it was signed after the Sindona trial. The Italian MLAT provides that the treaty is 
intended "solely" for mutual assistance between the government or law enforcement authorities of 
the contracting parties. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Together with a 
Related Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-Italy, art. 1, Nov. 9, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 98-25. The 
Thailand and Bahamian treaties provide that they are not intended or designed to provide assistance 
to private parties. Treaty with Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Thai]., art. 
1Mar. 19, 1986, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-18; Treaty with The Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Bah., art. 1, Aug. 19, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-17. The Canadian, 
Caymanian, and Mexican MLATs provide that they do "not give rise to a right on the part of a 
private party to obtain . . . any evidence." See Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, U.S.-Can., art. 2, Mar. 18, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-14 [hereinafter Canadian MLAT]; 
Cayman Islands, supra note 1; Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 9, 
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-13. 
208. Austria, supra note 88 at 10 (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
during the ratification process). The State Department's website discussing MLATs provides that 
defendants must generally utilize the letters rogatory process. See 
www.travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/j. See also Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 
176 (Testimony of White, former director of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, 
Department of Justice.) ("It was the conception in the very beginning that these kinds of law 
enforcement tools would be limited to the parties, the governments, the law enforcement authorities 
of each."). 
209. See Austria, supra note 87, at 10 (The government "has the job of assembling evidence to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, so it must have the tools to do so. The defense does not have 
the same job, and therefore does not need the same tools.") This statement reflects a deep 
misunderstanding of the role of prosecutors in our adversarial system of criminal justice. This 
misunderstanding is not surprising. As advocates, prosecutors are not immune from the pressure and 
desire to win. In fact, the many prosecution offices foster a "win-loss scorekeeping mentality." For a 
comprehensive discussion of this mentality and culture, see Catherine Fergnson-Gilbert, It is Not 
Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Score-Keeping Mentality 
Doing Justice forProsecufozs, 38 CAL, W. L. REV. 283 (2001) and Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good 
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (discussing institutional pressures on 
prosecutors to win at all costs). 
210. The government has never asserted that any treaty partner required the exclusion as a 
condition to signing the treaty. In fact, an executive official admits that "there was no discussion of 
how our treaty partners would react to receiving MLAT requests by or on behalf of criminal 
defendants" among the negotiators. Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 274. 
21 1. See Austria, supra note 87, at 10-1 1. ("[Tlhe defendant frequently has far greater access to 
evidence abroad than does the Government, since it is the defendant who chose to utilize foreign 
institutions in the first place."). 
212. "[Tlhere is nothing that the defense is being denied" because none of the MLATs provide 
the government with transnational compulsory process. See Austria, supra note 87, at 10-11. This 
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The creation of a compulsion disparity demonstrates the existence of 
executive bias in favor of the executive's role as law enforcer rather than 
minister of justice. The reason the executive does not protect a defendant's right 
to compulsory process appears obvious. After all, allowing defendants access to 
the treaty to obtain evidence would make successful prosecution of transnational 
offenders more difficult. It is easy, then, to dismiss consideration of the 
executive as an institution that could protect parity. 
Further analysis, however, renders this ready dismissal inappropriate. 
Executive officials did take pains to ensure that MLATs protected some defense 
interests. The treaties provide protections for the privilege against self- 
incrimination.213 They also protect defendants' sixth amendment right to 
confrontation by providing that the defendant (or his counsel) be present in 
foreign judicial proceedings to take evidence.214 Executive officials safeguarded 
these defense interests even in the face of questions from foreign governments 
about why these rights needed accommodation and amid complaints about the 
inconveniences these rights would cause in foreign judicial proceedings.215 
Certainly, protecting these interests does not make prosecution easier. 
Additionally, in at least one instance, the executive has requested defense 
statement contradicts testimony of other executive branch officials before the Senate. For example, a 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General stated that: 
[MLATs] provide, from our perspective, a much more effective means of obtaining 
evidence. . . . [An] MLAT obligates each country to provide evidence and other forms 
of assistance needed in criminal cases . . . .[I]n an MLAT, we have the opportunity to 
include procedures that will permit us to obtain evidence in a form that will be 
admissible in our courts ....[ O]ur MLATs are structured to streamline and make more 
effective the process of obtaining evidence. 
Id. at 2-3 (citing Worldwide Review of Status of U.S. Extradition Treaties and Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearings Befre the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee on 
Foreign Aflairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 36-37 (1987) (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division)). This same official testified in hearings that "[ilt has 
been increasingly common that significant evidence in major criminal cases will be found abroad. 
Obtaining such evidence, particularly in a form that will be admissible in our courts, has not been an 
easy matter. The purpose of our MLAT's is to provide a reliable and efficient means of obtaining 
this evidence." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of Mark M. Richard). The express 
provisions of MLATs create compulsory process for the government. For example, the U.S.-Mexico 
MLAT not only compels a witness to appear for a deposition, but also compels that the witness bring 
any requested documents: 
A person in the requested State whose testimony is requested shall be comvelled by 
subpoena, if necessary, by the competent authority of the requested Party to appear 
and testify or produce documents, records, and objects in the requested State to the 
same extent as in criminal investigations or proceedings in that State. 
Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican 
States for Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-Mex., Art. 7,27 I.L.M. 443,449 (emphasis added). Similar 
language exists in other MLATs. 
213. See 27 U.S.T. 2019, Article 13; NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 332. 
214. See 27 U.S.T. 2019, Article 12; NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 332-33. 
215. NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 355. 
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evidence under an MLAT despite the existence of the exclusionary language.216 
The executive's protection of these interests is significant for two reasons. 
First, it demonstrates the executive's willingness and ability to protect 
defendants' constitutional rights in certain circumstances. Second, it shows that 
foreign nations are amenable to persuasion fi-om the executive to include 
provisions in MLATs that are alien to their legal systems and procedures. Thus, 
the executive institution cannot easily be dismissed as an option for achieving 
the goal of parity, for it is best situated to convince foreign nations of the 
importance of parity and, at times, it protects defense interests. 
The executive's competence to protect parity norms depends upon whether, 
in most instances, the bias tips in favor of their role as ministers of justice or as 
advocates seeking to effectively prosecute transnational offenders. The question 
is whether the executive can be relied upon to strike the appropriate balance in 
every case. Experience in analogous contexts demonstrates the answer is likely 
no?17 While the executive may decide to protect parity by utilizing an MLAT 
216. In United States v. Des Mavteau, 162 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Fla. 1995), once the court granted 
the defendant's motion to depose a foreign national located in Canada, the prosecution agreed to 
utilize the Canadian MLAT to facilitate it. Id. at 372 n.5 ("The United States, after communicating 
with its office of International Affairs, informed the Court it is appropriate to utilize the treaty (with 
Canada) in this manner.") The prosecutor utilized the Canadian MLAT despite language which 
provides that it "shall not give rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain . . . any evidence 
. . . ." See Canadian MLAT, supra note 209, at art. 2. 
217. For example, prosecutors could not be relied upon to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence to defendants of their own volition, see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or to 
disclose witness perjury,see, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1972). 
In the past, the executive has expressed the view that it might seek evidence on behalf of defendants 
if there was a court order. According to an executive official: "Nothing in the proposed treaties 
would preclude the Department of Justice from making MLAT requests on behalf of prosecutors 
who wish to pursue claims raised by the defense . . . .[I]t would not be accurate to describe this 
process as 'making a request on behalf of a criminal defendant." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 
273 (emphasis in original). However, their position seems to be hardening. In its most recent 
statements on the issue, the Department of Justice has taken the position that it need not comply with 
a court order to request information on behalf of the defense using an existing MLAT. See 3 
MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, CRIMINAL, 
OBTAINING EVIDENCE, at 27 & n.12 (Supp. 1997) ("The Department of Justice, however, has 
continued to maintain that the restrictive language in the more recent mutual assistance treaties in 
criminal matters gives it veto power over whether the United States will make a court-ordered treaty 
request on behalf of a defendant."). In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
1992, the Deputy Legal Adviser for the Department of State, Mr. Alan Kreczko, testified that "the 
court . . . lack[s] the power or authority to compel the Government to make a request for the benefit 
of the defense over the objection of the prosecution." STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
107.N~ CONG., CONSULAR CONVENTIONS, EXTRADITION TREATIES, AND TREATIES RELATING TO 
MWLJAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMlNAL MATTERS 6, 40-41 (Comm. Print 19921992). If the 
prosecutor did not believe that the request was appropriate, and opposed the use of the MLAT for the 
request, Mr. Kreczko testified that it was unlikely that the Department of Justice would make the 
request. Id. In such cases, he stated, the Court would have to pursue the letters rogatory approach. Id. 
He also testified that if the prosecutor felt the request was inappropriate, it could be ignored. See id. 
Empirical analysis is necessary to determine whether or not the prosecution is actually requesting 
evidence on behalf of defendants under the treaties. Arguably, the prosecution's role as a Minister of 
Justice would require them to seek material and relevant evidence on a defendant's behalf. 
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for the benefit of defendants, it is risky to rely upon the executive's good graces 
to do so?18 Officials from the Department of Justice already express the view 
that even if a court orders them to request defense evidence under the treaty, 
they will refuse the order if they deem it to be inappropriate.219 Before 
completely dismissing the executive, however, its competence to resolve the 
disparity in access to process must be compared to that of the political process 
and the courts. An examination of the competence of the courts to protect parity 
follows. 
D. The Courts 
Criminal process questions are likely to be resolved by the courts because 
in most instances, the questions arise in the context of a pending criminal 
adjudication. Whether the court should provide a right and what the strength of 
that right should be are questions of institutional choice. While this Article seeks 
to answer these questions in the context of the compulsion disparity created by 
MLATs, similar questions arise when seeking to resolve most criminal process 
questions. 
The character of the right to compulsion parity defined by courts will 
reflect a choice amongst the relevant  institution^?^^ The three Subparts below 
218. Relying upon the good graces of the executive to protect compulsion parity is risky 
because they are advocates, aRer all. In hotly contested cases, for example, it is more likely that the 
prosecution will determine that the defense request is without merit. Prosecutors, just like defense 
lawyers, are not immune from the pressures of trial and the desire to win that comes long with it. 
Prosecutors have been known to hide physical evidence and bury statements inconsistent with their 
theory of guilt. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You 
Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Score-Keeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors, 38 CAL. W .  
L. REV. 283, 297-99 (2001). She describes a situation where the prosecution failed to disclose a 
statement from an eyewitness (the victim's brother) saying that the killers were white while the 
prosecution was prosecuting a black man for the crime. If some prosecutors will go this far in their 
zeal to win, there can be no question that some prosecutors will decide not to use the MLAT on 
behalf of a defendant in order to place themselves at an advantage during the trial. It is in hotly 
contested cases, when the defense's ability to rebut the prosecution's case with its own evidence 
could make the difference between conviction and acquittal, that the prosecution will most likely 
refuse to utilize the MLAT voluntarily on behalf of the defense. 
219. While the government may decide to use the MLAT for the benefit of defendants, nothing 
currently compels them to do so. An official from the Department of Justice expressed a similar 
view: 
There may be cases in which a court determines that because of the exceptional 
circumstances of the case, the interests of justice require that it order the prosecutor to 
make an MLAT request. In such a circumstance, the government would evaluate such 
a prospective order, reserving its rights to oppose issuance or appeal issuance, and if it 
lost such an appeal, to weigh the consequences of non-compliance. These 
consequences could include dismissal of the case against the defendant, or suffering 
such sanctions as the court might see fit to impose, including a prohibition on the 
government's use of certain evidence in the case in question. 
Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 273. 
220. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text. 
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respectively examine the considerations for deciding whether courts should 
define no rights, moderate rights or strong rights to compulsion parity in 
transnational criminal cases. The strength of the right reflects an institutional 
choice, and thus, a conception of the relative competence of the available 
decision-makersF21 
I .  No Rights to Compulsion Parity 
The courts can determine that no Sixth Amendment right to compulsion 
parity exists in the transnational context. This judicial inaction would leave 
MLATs in place and represent a decision that the political process and the 
executive are the appropriate forums for change. Before the decision to provide 
no remedy or judicial review is made, the form and degree of bias in the political 
and executive institutions must be examined and compared.222 Otherwise this 
judicial response can exacerbate existing biases or produce counter-intuitive 
results. 
When considering the relative merits of the political process and the 
executive, there are two factors to weigh. The first is the majoritarian bias that 
permeates the political process?23 The second is the executive bias in favor of 
its law enforcer role.224 The court should produce no rights or remedies only if 
the executive or political institutions, even in the face of their existing biases, 
are comparably better suited than the courts to achieve the goal of equitable 
process. 
A determination of no rights would seem to exacerbate, rather than 
alleviate existing biases in the executive and political institutions. It is easy, 
then, to assume that these institutions should not be relied upon to protect parity. 
But comparative institutional analysis rejects such a simplistic approach. The 
existence of a malfunction in other institutions does not, in and of itself, create a 
sufficient basis for the allocation of institutional responsibility to the courts. As 
explored in Subpart two, the courts may perform no better because of limited 
physical resources and personnel and lack of competence to decide the issue at 
hand?25 
2. Moderate Rights to CompuIsion Parity 
Rather than declaring no rights to compulsion parity, courts could define 
moderate compulsory process rights for transnational defendants by creating a 
flexible doctrinal standard. This approach indicates a determination by the 
221. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 71. 
222. Id. 
223. Seesupra notes 158-178 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 216-223 and accompanying text. 
225. IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 13, at 138-149. 
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courts that they are the institution best suited to protect the norm of parity in 
evidence-gathering. A moderate right requires courts to substitute their decision- 
making for that of other in~titutions.2~~ Rather than leaving it to the executive ta 
decide if it will respond to a defense request for evidence, or letting the Senate 
decide whether or not to ratify an MLAT, the court decides when and under 
what circumstances compulsion parity is warranted. 
A standard requires courts to determine, on a case by case basis, whether a 
defendant's rights to compulsion parity are violated. This increases the strain on 
courts' limited physical and personnel resources. Therefore, before deciding to 
substitute their decisions for those of other institutions by defining a moderate 
right, courts must decide whether the balance of competence and scale favors 
that sub~titution.2~~ Competence refers to the judges' ability to investigate, 
understand, and make substantive d e c i s i a n ~ . ~ ~ ~  It is determined, for the most 
part, by training and e ~ ~ e r i e n c e . 2 ~ ~  The strain on the court's limited resources is 
reduced when its competence in an issue is high.230 
Federal judges have special competence in criminal procedure issues as a 
result of experience. The federal criminal docket constitutes a significant portion 
of the cases federal courts adjudicate each year. Judges frequently interpret the 
constitutional provisions governing a defendant's rights and a prosecutor's 
obligations in such cases. Despite the strain on the court's limited resources, 
balancing the issues in order to determine how to protect compulsion parity in 
transnational criminal cases is well within the competence of the courts. 
However, transnational cases in general and MLATs in particular raise 
potential foreign policy issues, a traditional area of doubt about the courts' 
corn~etence.2~~ Conducting foreign affairs usually requires secrecy, flexibility 
and the ability to respond quickly to changed cir~umstances?~~ Courts do not 
have independent access to foreign intelligence and thus may not understand the 
far-reaching implications of their decisions. Judges must consider the possibility 
that their rulings on issues involving foreign affairs unwittingly expose sensitive 
information and reduce the executive's flexibility to respond?33 
226. See id. at 150. 
227. Id. Scale refers to "the resources and budget available to the judiciary and the constraints 
on the expansion and size of the adjudicative process." Id. at 138. 
228. Id. at 138-39. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 138-150. 
231. Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for 
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 380-394 (1984) [hereinafter Taking Institutions 
Seriously]. The executive has speculated that including a provision that allowed defense access to 
the treaty might prevent some nations from entering into MLATs. Austria, supra note 87, at 10. 
232. Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 233, at 381. 
233. Id. at 382. The Supreme Court is reluctant to adjudicate issues that it views as implicating 
foreign policy or foreign relations. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 697 (1998) 
("Because foreign relations are specifically committed by the Constitution to the political branches, 
U.S. Const., art. 11, 8 2, cl. 2, we would not make a discretionary judgment premised on inducing 
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A flexible balancing approach may best serve the goal of achieving 
compulsion parity while reducing foreign policy concerns. How would such a 
standard work? In cases where defendants require foreign evidence, the court 
would first determine whether the requested evidence is relevant and material. 
This requirement of materiality is consistent with current doctrinal approaches in 
domestic criminal cases. If the requested evidence is material, the court could 
then order the prosecution to request the evidence under the existing MLAT or 
risk 
This is a viable option. The treaties require that requests for evidence come 
from the government and not a private party. However, they are silent regarding 
the ability of the government to request evidence on behalfof a defendant. One 
executive official expressed the view that if a request was made by the 
government on behalf of a defendant, "the United States would expect the 
foreign government to treat the request like any other MLAT request made by 
the United This flexible case by case approach requires courts to do 
more, but avoids invalidating MLATs, thereby avoiding serious foreign policy 
concerns. 
3. Strong Rights to Compulsion Parity 
An alternative approach for the courts is to find a strong Sixth Amendment 
right to compulsion parity in transnational criminal cases. The strongest Sixth 
Amendment right would require courts to substitute their decisions for political 
process and executive determinations. By creating a clear doctrinal rule that 
compulsion parity is a constitutional requirement in transnational cases and 
MLATs are unconstitutional because of the disparity they create, the courts 
reject Senate and executive determinations that the disparity is appropriate. 
The advantage of a clear rule is that it requires minimal judicial activity. If 
MLATs are unconstitutional because of the disparity they create, the decision of 
how to remedy the disparity falls to other institutions. In the meantime, in the 
absence of MLATs, defendants and prosecutors would be forced to rely upon 
the evidence-gathering market to obtain foreign evidence. By finding a strong 
right to compulsory process, the courts choose the market as the institution to 
protect parity, at least until new MLATs are negotiated. Though the pre-MLAT 
them to adopt policies in relation to other nations without squarely confronting the propriety of 
grounding judicial action on such a premise"). 
234. There is precedent for this. In United States v, Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Fla. 
1995), once the court granted the defendants motion to depose a foreign national located in Canada, 
the prosecution agreed to utilize the MLAT with Canada to facilitate it. Id. at 372 n.5 ("The United 
States, after communicating with its office of International Affairs, informed the Court it is 
appropriate to utilize the treaty [with Canada] in this manner.") Similarly, in United States v. 
Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), the court required prosecutors to obtain defense evidence 
utiiizing the existing MLAT. See 3 MICHAEL &BELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE - CRIMINAL 27 & n. 12. (Supp. 1997). 
235. Cayman Islands, supra note I, at 274. 
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market was far from perfect, it represents a viable institutional choice for 
attaining equal access to foreign evidence between prosecutors and defendants. 
Creation of a strong right might motivate the executive to protect parity 
explicitly in the treaties. Rather than relying upon the inefficient evidence- 
gathering market, the executive can decide to negotiate parity-protecting 
language into future treaties, as well as save existing treaties by negotiating 
memorandums of understanding that explicitly require prosecutors to request 
foreign evidence on behalf of defendants. The new treaties and the 
memorandums of understanding for existing MLATs could contain a materiality 
requirement in order to allay a foreign nation's concern that it will be inundated 
with frivolous or baseless requests for defense evidence. 
Negotiation of memorandums of understanding can likely be done with 
minimal delay as a result of the special relationships developed between the 
nations during the process of negotiating M L A T S ? ~ ~  Attorneys for the OIL% 
already schedule annual or biannual meetings with foreign Central Authorities to 
discuss issues and problems.237 If the executive decides to negotiate 
memorandums of understanding, the issue could simply be added to the agenda. 
If the nation is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
~ i ~ h t s ~ ~ ~  (often described as the International Bill of Rights), it will likely sign 
such a memorandum since the Covenant contains explicit protection of the right 
to compulsion parity.239 
Similarly, a court-declared right provides the defense lobby with a 
236. "[Tlhe ratification of an MLAT reflects the fact that the two countries consider each other 
important and that their mutual legal assistance relationship is something that they are proud of' as a 
national asset. Hams Lecture, supra note 90. Harris also acknowledges that during the negotiation 
process, personal relationships and contacts were developed that facilitate cooperation. The Director 
of the OIA stated, "A related advantage [of MLATS] is that it is far easier to amend or revise a 
bilateral treaty than a comprehensive multilateral treaty. For instance, the U.S. is in the process now 
of negotiating revisions and amendments to some of our older MLATs, on such topics as video link 
or asset forfeiture and asset sharing. This enables states to add new ideas to the text of the bilateral 
MLAT with a minimum of delay, or respond quickly to changes in legislation. Obviously, it is not 
possible to revise multilateral crime conventions without a great deal of difficulty." id. 
237. Thomas Snow, Symposium: Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: The Investigation and 
Prosecution of White Collar Crime: International Challenges and Legal Tools Available to Address 
Them, 11 WM. &MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 209, n.68 (2002). 
238. I\lt. 14(3)(e), entered info force March 23, 1976,999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
239. At least one treaty, the U.S.-Austria MLAT, specifically provides that the Austrian Central 
Authority will make requests from the U.S. on behalf of their defendants under the treaty. See 
Austria, supra note 87, at 14 (1996). In the technical analysis of this lxeaty, this provision was 
explained as follows: "The Austrian delegation indicated that under its legal system, courts are 
required to seek evidence to assist defense counsel as well as prosecutors. The Austrian Cen-1 
Authority therefore will make such requests to the United States under the Treaty. The United States 
delegation stated that the United States Central Authority ordinarily does not make treaty requests on 
behalf of defense counsel. The negotiators agreed that the Treaty is not available for use by private 
counsel representing civil litigants as a means of evidence-gathering in criminal or civil matters. 
Private litigants in the United States may continue to obtain evidence from Austria by letters 
rogatory, an avenue of international assistance leR undisturbed by the Treaty." Id. 
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powerful tool to counteract the majoritarian bias that previously existed in the 
political process. Senators need no longer fear being voted out of office when 
they refuse to ratify an MLAT which creates a compulsion disparity. The cover 
of a court ruling insulates them from threats of ouster. 
Defining a strong right to compulsory process has many disadvantages, 
however. MLATs are important law enforcement tools in a world of 
transnational crime. Their creation entailed monumental efforts and hard-fought 
compromises to harmonize differing legal systems in order to combat the 
exponential rise in global crime.240 Effective transnational prosecutions require 
mandatory mechanisms for obtaining evidence from foreign nations. The 
willingness of nations to work with the United States to create these mechanisms 
depends upon our willingness to enter into MLATS?~~  Declaring MLATs 
unconstitutional would return nations to square one, creating international 
friction and irritation?42 
Even if nations feel inclined to renegotiate, their own domestic politics may 
make renegotiation difficult. The court's decision invalidating MLATs 
compromises the executive's authority and legitimacy to negotiate new treaties. 
How would the executive officials convince foreign nations that these 
renegotiated treaties would not be declared unconstitutional? Moreover, if new 
treaties cannot be negotiated, the United States may once again resort to the 
unilateral actions that so angered foreign nations in the past.243 A strong right 
thus raises serious foreign policy concerns. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Comparative institutional analysis must inform any decision of how to 
obtain a desired goal or policy, because there is rarely one easily identified first 
and best institution. The framework teaches that the choice is amongst imperfect 
and flawed alternatives, each burdened with its own benefits and drawbacks. 
Explicit institutional comparison teases out existing institutional biases and 
helps to avoid unanticipated results or unintended consequences. Without 
comparative analysis, a role may be defined for the court that exacerbates an 
240. See supra notes 182-208 and accompanying text. 
241. "[Wle need to receive confirmation from the Senate that the Senate believes that the 
conclusion of MLAT's is in the best interest of the United States. We cannot sensibly continue in 
this direction if the Senate believes otherwise. We cannot reasonably expect foreign govemments to 
adopt meaningful cooperative agreements with us if we are unable to ratify the MLAT's that we 
have urged them to conclude. Senate advice and consent to ratification of the six pending MLAT's 
also would show foreign governments that their efforts to cooperate with the United States in law 
enforcement matters have not been in vain." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 221 (testimony of 
Mary Mochary). 
242. Of course, the executive could mitigate the foreign policy damage caused by this approach 
by alloxing foreign nations to continue to request evidence from the United States. 
243. See supra notes 118,121-124 and accompanying text. 
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existing malfunction in another institution or produces a counter-intuitive result. 
No matter what the criminal process question is, explicit institutional 
consideration and comparison forces contemplation of nuanced questions and 
avoids simplistic answers and knee-jerk institutional choices. 
Applying the comparative framework to the question of how to achieve 
compulsion equity in transnational criminal cases demonstrates its usefulness. 
At first blush, it may appear that a strong right to compulsion parity in 
transnational criminal cases would best protect the twin goals of accuracy and 
fairness in criminal adjudications. However, comparative institutional analysis 
reveals a potentially counter-intuitive negative result from this seemingly 
attractive option. 
Strong compulsory process rights could undermine accuracy norms. Under 
a strong rights approach, if the executive is unable to renegotiate the existing 
MLATs to explicitly protect parity, the parties are left to rely upon the evidence- 
gathering market that existed prior to M L A T S . ~ ~ ~  This market does not provide 
the parties with reliable access to material and relevant evidence from foreign 
nations. Surprisingly, a strong right makes prosecution of the guilty more 
difficult and increases the risk that a factually innocent person will be 
wrongfully convicted. Accordingly, a strong right is not the best option. 
A moderate right to compulsion parity provides the best solution to 
remedying the compulsion disparity in transnational evidence-gathering. The 
potential problem with a moderate rights approach is uncertainty about whether 
a foreign nation will comply with a government request on behalf of defendants. 
However, nothing in the treaties' language prevents this type of request, and the 
U.S. government has expressed the view that foreign nations will honor it.245 A 
moderate right would leave MLATs intact, thereby avoiding serious foreign 
policy concerns. Under this approach, the courts would determine, on a case by 
case basis, whether to order the prosecution to request defense evidence. 
Although a moderate right requires courts to use more resources in making case 
by case materiality determinations, these decisions are already made by courts in 
most criminal cases. The increased burden upon the courts will thus be 
negligible. With MLATs in place, both parties will be able to present foreign 
evidence to the trier of fact. Comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that 
a moderate right provides the best safeguard for protecting the innocent and 
convicting the guilty in transnational criminal cases. 
244. See supra notes 243-250 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 241, 
